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A Reply to Abramson’s Response to My “Beyond Mind” Papers 
and Some Reflections on Wilber V
 
Elías Capriles
University of the Andes
Mérida, Venezuela
, 31(2), 2012, pp. 118-165 
The critique of Wilber’s twentieth century works presented in my three Beyond Mind papers (Capriles, 2000, 2006, 2009) was written 
because, upon reading the works in question, I perceived 
in them misunderstandings of the theory and practice 
of the higher Buddhist teachings in general and of the 
Dzogchen teachings in particular that seemed so serious 
to me, as to arouse an urge to respond to them. As to 
subsequent Wilber works, I had no plans of addressing 
them, partly because I was not inclined to read further 
pieces of writing by the author in question (some of his 
subjects—e.g., developmental psychology—are foreign 
to my interests, as I do not find them relevant to spiritual 
and/or transpersonal development, and on the other 
hand I find his construal of Buddhism and many of 
his views on subjects of my interest rather troubling), 
partly because I did not foresee the turnabout that is 
currently giving rise to Wilber V, and partly because 
for a number of years now Venezuelan governmental 
policies have made it quite difficult for me to buy books 
in English—and hence I had to become selective and 
procure only those books that it was imperative for me 
to read in order to complete the various long works on 
subjects not directly related to Wilber that I have been 
preparing since the turn of the century.1
However, in the lapse between completion of 
the last paper in the Beyond Mind series and the email 
announcing that the paper was about to go through the 
final editing by IJTS staff for it to go to press, I went 
through a series of works by different authors—including 
two Wilber pieces published in 2000 and one published 
in 2009—which, upon receiving the news in question, 
made me partially update the latest of my Beyond 
Mind papers (Capriles, 2009), making additions and 
corrections. Even though I was aware that Wilber was 
undergoing a shift, I had not read most of the ensuing 
works, and I made no moves to overcome difficulties and 
procure them so as to be able to assess them, as I had no 
intention to intellectually persecute Wilber—and, even 
if I had been intent on critiquing all that he produced, 
to procure and read his relevant newer works (provided 
I could have managed to acquire them), and then carry 
out the required, major overhauling of the paper, would 
have been impossible in the short time at my disposal.
Then, after the publication of the final paper 
in the series, author and webmaster of the website 
Integral World Frank Visser2 cautioned me that the 
Beyond Mind papers (Capriles, 2000, 2006, 2009) 
and the books based on them could be dismissed for 
failing to address the current Wilber. In response, I 
prepared the preliminary discussion of Wilber V that 
Visser published on his website (Capriles, 2010c). A few 
months after that, Glenn Hartelius, current editor of the 
IJTS, emailed me a reply to the Beyond Mind papers 
written by reader John Abramson3 (2010) that criticized 
me for failing to address Wilber V, and Hartelius urged 
me to prepare a reply to the objections thus raised for a 
future issue of the journal in question. These two facts 
made me aware of the need to write this reply, and of 
including it as a new section on Wilber V in the book 
I was preparing: The Beyond Mind Papers: Transpersonal 
and Metatranspersonal Theory (Capriles, in press). 
However, a thorough assessment of Wilber V would 
have filled a significant number of pages (perhaps less, 
perhaps more than my assessment of the earlier Wilber), 
would have made that book much longer than I had 
originally promised the publishers, and would have 
delayed its delivery far beyond the specified deadline. 
Thus this reply to the objections in question—which 
synthesize the piece published in Integral World and the 
most relevant parts of the initial draft of my original 
reply to Abramson—will only address general issues in 
Wilber V and specific points of Abramson’s (2010) reply 
to my papers.
Finally, I duly thank Mr. John Abramson for 
offering me the possibility to confine myself to precise 
themes of Wilber V, as well as for the tone of his valuable 
reply (which, I must acknowledge, is kinder and more 
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respectful than that of my objections to Wilber). I extend 
my thanks to author-editors Frank Visser and Glenn 
Hartelius for their roles in eliciting the production of 
this reply and the corresponding book section.
A Reply to Abramson
(With a Preliminary Discussion of Wilber V)
The first thing to note is that, although Wilber purportedly abandoned his former pantheistic 
emanationism,4 he has still metaphysically posited 
a transcendent reality (which, as clearly shown in 
Appendix I to both Beyond Mind III [Capriles, 2009] 
and the above mentioned upcoming book [Capriles, in 
press], no Buddhist school or vehicle has ever posited)—
insisting that it should flavor the immanent while at the 
same time being flavored by it. This is apparent in the 
following passage by Wilber (Wilber & Cohen, 2002, p. 
2), which Abramson (2010) cited:
the real key to this discussion, I think, is when you 
understand that the only way you can permanently 
and fully realize emptiness is if you transform, evolve, 
or develop your vehicle in the world of form. The 
vehicles that are going to realize emptiness have to be 
up to the task. That means they have to be developed; 
they have to be transformed and aligned with spiritual 
realization. That means that the transcendent and the 
immanent have to, in a sense, flavor each other ... . The 
best of a nondual or integral realization is that we 
have to basically work on both [the world of time and 
“the timeless”]. We have to polish our capacity, in a 
sense, to fully realize emptiness, moment to moment. 
But it’s the emptiness of all forms arising moment 
to moment. So we have to have a radical embrace of 
the world of samsara as the vehicle and expression of 
nirvana itself.
Moreover, here Wilber continued to incur on 
an error pointed out in my papers (which Abramson 
overlooked in his review) and in the aforementioned 
book—namely that of identifying sam.   sāra with the 
world of form, thereby implying nirvān.  a to be a formless 
condition. The term world of form may be understood 
in at least three different senses: (1) As whatever is 
configured, including, (a) the continuum of the tsel 
(rtsal) mode of manifestation of energy, which involves 
the ever-changing configuration that samsaric beings 
experience as phenomena of the physical universe, which 
is manifest in most experiences of all three realms of 
sam. sāra (it is manifest in all experiences pertaining to 
the realms of sensuality and form, and in most of those 
pertaining to that of formlessness), but also in most 
events of nonstatic nirvān. a; (b) the rölpa (rol pa) mode of 
manifestation of energy, involving Thögel and Yangthik 
visions—and possibly also some (c) phenomena of dang 
(gdangs) energy such as mental images, as they manifest 
in fantasy, imagination, visualization and so on;5 (2) as 
all that involves the figure-ground division, which is 
characteristic of two of the three realms of samsāra—
those of sensuality and form—but which could 
repeatedly arise in the nirvān. a of higher vehicles as well; 
and (3) as the samsaric realm of form, which excludes all 
types of nirvān. a, but which may not be identified with 
samsāra, for as just noted, the latter includes the other 
two samsaric realms as well.
Therefore the nirvān. a of higher vehicles does 
not exclude configurations of any of the three types 
subsumed under (1), not does it need exclude the arising 
of the figure-ground division discussed under (2). In 
fact, the Direct Introduction proper to Dzogchen is an 
initial disclosure of Dzogchen-qua-Base—that is, an 
instance of Dzogchen-qua-Path—that as a rule, rather 
than obliterating awareness (of) the sensory continuum, 
enhances the awareness in question, making it far fresher 
and more vivid. For its part, the supreme nirvān. a while 
on the Path as it repeatedly manifests in the practice of 
Tekchö (first stage in the practice of the Upadeśavarga 
series of Dzogchen teachings), which consists in the 
unconcealment as the dharmakāya of the true condition 
of dang energy (i.e., of the basic stuff of thought), rather 
than obliterating awareness (of) the sensory continuum, 
results in a bare, fresh awareness (of) the latter. In 
fact, the instant the dharmakāya manifests, whichever 
thoughts that are occurring at the time—including the 
superimposed thought-contents that in the preceding 
moment were conditioning one’s experience—instantly 
liberate themselves, dissolving like feathers entering fire 
and thereby cleansing the doors of perception so that the 
sensory continuum may appear as it (is): infinite and 
holy rather than finite and corrupt. Likewise, higher 
nirvān. a qua Fruit—including Dzogchen-qua-Fruit, the 
Fruit of the Inner Tantras of the Path of Transformation 
and the Fruit of the Mahāyāna—except during sleep 
in the clear light, during the intermediate state of the 
moment of death (Tib. chikhaï bardo [’chi kha’ i bar do]) 
and so on, does involve form in the sense listed as (1): 
as that which from one samsaric perspective I called the 
world’s dynamic configuration.
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Consequently, Wilber is right in asserting 
emptiness to be the emptiness of all the forms that 
arise from moment to moment, yet he is incorrect in 
identifying the forms in question with samsāra—just as 
he is wrong in implicitly identifying nirvān. a with the 
absence of form, for as noted above what disappears in 
supreme nirvān. a is the threefold avidyā that in sam.  sāra 
conceals and distorts the true condition of what samsaric 
beings experience as the world’s configuration, and not 
so the latter. Finally, both Dzogchen and Chán deny that 
in order to permanently and fully realize emptiness one 
must transform, evolve or develop what Wilber called our 
vehicle—a term that Buddhism as a whole would reject, for 
if one had a vehicle, then there would have to be someone 
different from the vehicle to own it, drive it, and so forth, 
but according to the most basic tenets of Buddhism such 
owner-driver does not exist (and hence Buddhism refutes 
it with sophisticated, compelling arguments which 
include Candrakīrti’s Sevenfold reasoning). In fact, in 
the vehicles in question, it is the recurrence of realization 
that progressively transforms the person—making selfish 
action gradually dwindle and selfless activity benefiting 
others gradually increase; making the psyche constantly 
gain in self-consistency; and progressively neutralizing 
the proclivity for evil, self-encumbering and in general 
the propensities for delusion and concealment, until 
these are burned out and Buddhahood obtains. In 
Dzogchen Atiyoga, that is precisely the function of the 
repeated reGnition of Dzogchen-qua-Base referred to as 
Dzogchen-qua-Path, just as in Chán it is the function 
of the repeated realization of the absolute truth of the 
Mahāyāna—that is, of the true condition of phenomena 
(Skt. dharmatā; Tib. chöjing [chos bdyings]), of the all-
encompassing space where phenomena manifest (Skt. 
dharmadhātu; Tib. chönyi [chos nyid]), of emptiness 
(Skt. śūnyatā; Tib. tönpanyi [stong pa nyid]), and so forth 
(which, as made clear in the Beyond Mind papers and 
their respective notes, according to Tibetan Buddhists 
other than Tsongkhapa and most of his followers, is not 
the experience of nonexistence induced by a negation).6
Another of Abramson’s (2010) objections is the 
following:
Capriles offered a definition of supreme spirituality 
that would ostensibly include all authentic traditions 
and overcomes the problems presented in Wilber’s 
model: “all that is involved in the transition from 
samsara to nirvana” ([Capriles, 2009,] p. 15). I have 
argued that Wilber would see such a definition as 
partial. It apparently takes no account of Wilber’s 
view that the generation of novel stages of human 
consciousness in samsara is part of the “basic rule” 
of spirituality which is the uniting of nirvān. a with 
sam.  sara: 
But the basic rule is: resting as emptiness, 
embrace the entire world of form. And the 
world of form is unfolding. It is evolving. It is 
developing. And therefore resting as blissful 
emptiness, you ecstatically embrace and push 
against the world of form as a duty (Wilber, 
2002b). (p. 184)
The above is related to the same problem 
of identifying sam.   sāra with the world of form and 
implicitly identifying nirvān. a with the absence of forms. 
The truth is that for nearly all Tibetan Buddhists except 
for Tsongkhapa and his followers, in the context of the 
Mahāyāna and the Vajrayāna, sam.  sāra consists in relative 
truth and nirvān. a in absolute truth, and relative truth 
(the etymology of which, as shown in the Beyond Mind 
papers and in the above-mentioned upcoming book of 
mine, is obstruction to correctness / thoroughly confused) 
absolutely lacks existence and truth—absolute truth 
being the only truth there [is] (note that even though 
the concept of the two truths is not widely used in the 
Dzogchen teachings, these teachings agree that what the 
Mahāyāna and the Vajrayāna call relative truth is untrue 
and nonexistent). As Gorampa put it (corresponding yet 
not identical translation in Thakchoe, 2007, pp. 144-
145):7
The relative truths enunciated in those contexts 
[e.g., in the texts of Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti] 
are nonexistent. Since [in absolute truth] there is 
no erroneous apprehending subject, this subject’s 
corresponding object—[relative truth]—does not 
exist.
Thakchoe (2007, p. 145) rightly asserted this 
view to be shared by Indian Master Jayānanda and 
Tibetan Masters Rendawa, Shakya Chogden, Taktsang 
Lotsawa, Kunchen Pema Karpo, Karmapa Mikyo 
Dorje, Ju Mipham, and Gendün Chöphel. However, 
the view in question is not only an interpretation by 
these Masters, for it is the original view of Nāgārjuna, 
Āryadeva, and Candrakīrti, as well as of the Tibetan 
Master Dölpopa and of nearly all Tibetans who do not 
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follow Je Tsongkhapa—and, most important, it is the 
one found in the Dzogchen teachings.
At any rate, the relative, albeit nonexistent, 
inescapably produces suffering, and although both 
suffering and the one who suffers are untrue and 
nonexistent, in sam.  sāra both suffering and the one who 
suffers are experienced as absolutely true and important—
the very raison d’ être of Buddhism being that of putting 
a definitive end to suffering. It does so in the only way 
possible: by realizing, in nonstatic nirvān. a, the absolute 
truth that is the only truth there is, in which neither 
suffering nor one who suffers or enjoys are experienced, 
and then coming to the point at which one no longer 
departs from this truth—never again having the delusive 
experience of relative truth and the suffering it implies. 
In fact, since the relative truth that corresponds to 
sam.  sāra and that is a thoroughly confused perspective and 
an obstruction to correctness is utterly nonexistent and 
as such untrue, there is nothing different from nirvān. a 
for the latter to embrace: though in sam.   sāra a duality 
between sam.  sāra and nirvān. a is perceived by those who 
have embraced the Buddhist or other similar teachings, 
in nonstatic nirvān. a—both as it manifest on the Path 
and as the Fruit of Buddhahood that consists in the 
uninterrupted manifestation of the svabhāvikāya that was 
discussed in the evaluation of Wilber IV’s four last fulcra 
in the Beyond Mind papers and the upcoming book—
nothing that is not the absolute truth is apprehended 
and hence no relative truth and no samsāra, and hence 
no duality between sam.   sāra and nirvān. a, is perceived. 
In the words of Kunkhyen Pema Karpo (corresponding 
yet not identical translation in Thakchoe, 2007, pp. 145-
146):8
To the extent that remaining obstructions subsist, to 
that extent multifaceted appearances are perceived 
during post-Contemplation as illusory, and so forth. 
However, from the moment all latencies [of previous 
defilements] are totally [eliminated], relative 
phenomena are never again perceived. Instead, one 
ceaselessly dwells on the essence of Contemplation.
However, the knowledge that the only way 
to definitively quench suffering is to attain nirvān. a is 
likely to turn other forms of craving (Skt. tr. s .na; Pāli, 
tan. hā) into craving for self-annihilation in nirvān. a 
(Skt. vibhavātr. s .na; Pāli, vibhava-tan. hā)—which would 
sustain samsāra, forestalling the occurrence of nirvān. a. 
It was merely as an intellectual means to neuter this 
samsāra-sustaining craving that Śākyamuni in the 
Prajñāpāramitāsūtras, and Nāgārjuna and his successors 
in their Prajñāpāramitā-based Mādhyamaka philosophy, 
expressed in samsaric, relative terms the perspective of 
nirvān. a from which there is no duality between sam.  sāra 
and nirvān. a.
Abramson’s objection is very similar to the 
criticism of my position that a Nepalese spiritual 
teacher made in an earlier version of the Transpersonal 
Psychology entry of Wikipedia, which objected that:
They (Elias Capriles and others) too misses [sic} 
the game ’cause don’t they know what Nagarjuna 
among many [B]uddhist siddhas say “Where there 
is neither an addition of nirvana nor a removal of 
samsara; There, what samsara is discriminated from 
what nirvana?”9
The only truth has always been the absolute 
truth, and hence realization of this truth does not 
add anything to what (was) there from beginningless 
time, whereas relative truth never existed in truth and 
hence its elimination could not remove anything from 
whatever (was) there from beginningless time. Likewise, 
since relative truth / sam.  sāra never existed, and nirvān. a 
is so only in relation to samsāra, there is nothing to 
discriminate. However, Nāgārjuna was a Mahāyāna 
Buddhist, and as such he wrote all that he wrote in order 
to lead beings from sam.   sāra to nonstatic nirvān. a and 
thus to put an end to the excruciatingly painful illusion 
of suffering and one who suffers—rather than going 
to sleep because, since all beings had always been in 
nirvān. a, there was simply nothing to do. Therefore, he 
fully agreed that if one mistakes for nirvān. a the higher 
realms of samsāra—or the base-of-all where neither 
sam.  s āra nor nirvān. a are active but that technically 
pertains to samsāra, for that matter10—one will not have 
even the slightest chance to “attain” nirvān. a and thus to 
put an end to illusory sam. s āra with the equally illusory 
yet excruciating suffering and pain it involves. In fact, 
Buddhism arose because Siddhārtha Gautama realized 
that his teachers ascended to high samsaric realms—the 
second, Udraka Rāmaputra (Or Udrako Rāmaputro), 
reaching to the peak of samsāra—but did not go beyond 
samsāra, and aware that this did not represent a true 
liberation he went on to seek the way to put an end to 
samsāra, “attaining” nonstatic nirvān. a—which then 
made him realize that there was neither a sam.  s āra to 
transcend not a nirvān. a to attain.
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The Prajñāpāramitāsūtras and Nāgārjuna’s 
Mādhyamaka philosophy expressed in concepts the 
realization of the nonduality of sam.   s āra and nirvān. a that 
takes place in nonstatic nirvān. a as part of an intellectual, 
logical method to lead beyond the intellect and its 
logical fetters. This approach—as valid as many other 
Buddhist approaches—is in stark contrast with that of 
the Dzogchen Path, which consists in creating, at the 
very onset of the Path, the conditions for an extreme 
experience of sam.  s āra to occur and be immediately 
followed by an instance of the supreme nonstatic nirvān. a 
referred to as Dzogchen-qua-Path, so that the individual 
may, by the same token, have a taste of the spontaneous 
liberation of Dzogchen, become familiar with the 
difference between sam.  s āra and nirvān. a as perceived 
from the perspective of samsāra, and in the realization 
of nonstatic nirvān. a discover the nonduality of sam. s āra 
and nirvān. a that is realized in nonstatic nirvān. a only. 
Repetition of this should eliminate all doubts as to the 
fact that the true condition of reality is the one that 
became patent in nonstatic nirvān. a—and hence that 
there is no duality between sam. s āra and nirvān. a. Once 
all such doubts have been eliminated, the practitioner is 
introduced to special yogic means that help all samsaric 
experiences free themselves spontaneously in nirvān. a. 
Realizing the nonduality of sam.  sāra and nirvān. a 
without going beyond sam. s āra in the occurrence of 
nonstatic nirvān. a is of little use, for so long as sam. sāra 
is manifest, realization of the nonduality of sam. sāra and 
nirvān. a cannot be more than an intellectual realization 
pertaining to relative truth that as such is delusive (i.e., it 
is an obstruction to correctness in one who is thoroughly 
confused), which therefore sustains samsāra. Is this that the 
two critics under discussion want higher Buddhism to 
achieve?
Then there is the question of whether the above 
perspective may be categorized as ascending, as Abramson 
suggested. Throughout the papers the latter was replying to, 
I made it entirely clear that the sense in which Wilber used 
the terms ascent and descent is, to say the least, out-and-out 
secondary in comparison with the metaphenomenological 
and metaexistential meanings I give these terms—yet 
all these arguments do not seem to have been taken 
into account in Abramson’s reply. Moreover, not even 
in Wilber’s sense may the view expounded above be 
characterized as ascending, for it does not urge beings to 
set out to climb toward nirvān. a in order to escape from 
sam. sāra (a project that, as noted above, since it would 
sustain the relative truth that is the essence of samsāra, 
would do no more than sustain samsāra): whereas in the 
relative reality of sam. sāra there seems to be something to 
escape from, someone to carry out the escape, an escape, 
and somewhere to escape to, the reason why methods 
that make it possible for samsaric experience to initially 
dissolve, so that absolute truth may be realized in nonstatic 
nirvān. a, are applied on the Dzogchen Path, is that only this 
realization proves that there was never a relative truth or a 
sam.  sāra to escape from and a nirvān. a to attain, and hence 
that there is no duality between these two conditions—a 
method that, by comparison, shows the mere intellectual 
idea of this fact to lack ultimate relevance. In fact, since 
there is no relative truth or sam.  sāra to embrace, only this 
realization may validly (albeit metaphorically) be called 
“embracing samsāra.”
Besides trying to show the view I expound to 
be ascending in Wilber’s sense of the term, Abramson 
(2010) attempted to show Wilber V’s position not to be 
ascending in the senses I give this term:
Wilber’s (2001) end note 1 in Sex, Ecology and Spir-
ituality. … is concerned with Wilber’s explanation 
of the Buddhist “no-self” but its relevance here is 
the way Wilber weaves some of his theories with an 
explanation of the Tantric and the Dzogchen Bud-
dhist concepts of emptiness, and how this relates to 
the nondual state. For example, in relation to Dzog-
chen, and seemingly in accord with Capriles’ work, 
Wilber commented:
Different meditation practices engineer different 
states and different experiences, but pure Pres-
ence itself is unwavering, and thus the highest 
approach in Dzogchen is “Buddhahood without 
meditation”: not the creation but rather the di-
rect recognition of an already perfectly present 
and freely given primordial Purity.” (Wilber, 
2001, pp. 730-731)
As to how Wilber wove into some of his 
theories an explanation of the Tantric Buddhist and the 
Dzogchen concepts of emptiness, below, in the discussion 
of Abramson’s (2010) defense of what were previously 
Wilber’s last four fulcra and which are now his final four 
stages of cognitive development, and in some of the notes 
to it, I showed that Wilber did not distinguish  between 
the different understandings of emptiness. In particular, 
the author Wilber cited as his source for his explanation 
of the successive attainment of the four kāyas and hence 
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of the last four fulcra of his former system and of what 
now are the last four stages of the cognitive line of 
development, purportedly follows Tsongkhapa, whose 
understanding of emptiness was radically different from 
Wilber’s, as well as, (a) from that of Tibetan Masters 
who are not Tsongkhapa’s followers, (b) from the two 
senses of emptiness in the Dzogchen teachings (namely 
that of emptiness as the Base’s primordial purity and that 
of emptiness a mere illusory experience), and (c) from 
emptiness of substances other than the absolute.11 (I will 
touch upon this point once more below.)
As to the Wilber passage cited by Abramson 
and reproduced above, it no doubt acknowledges that 
realization cannot be produced or constructed, yet this 
understanding is in diametral opposition to Wilber’s 
structural paradigm and metaphenomenologically 
ascending view, which as shown throughout the 
Beyond Mind papers is incompatible with the 
metaphenomenologically descending stance of Buddhism 
in general and of Dzogchen in particular—and which, 
as shown here, Wilber has continued to uphold. Thus 
if it proves anything, it is that Wilber has continued to 
contradict himself—as evinced by Abramson’s (2010) 
reply, for the passage Abramson cited outright contradicts 
the following assertion he made:
It is certainly illuminating to consider further 
why Wilber feels stage development is important, 
beginning with one way he feels it can be achieved. 
Wilber muddies the water by claiming that 
practising meditation is the best, or among the best, 
means of achieving stage development; in which 
case following an authentic spiritual path involving 
meditation practice would automatically result in 
stage progression, and the issue of pursuing stage 
development would be redundant.
Awakening is attained without meditation yet 
meditation is the best way to achieve stage development, 
which is indispensable for being able to attain Awakening: 
the contradiction is blatant. Furthermore, although the 
fact that Wilber acknowledged that stage development 
may occur as a by-product of meditation seems positive, in 
a passage cited above he explicitly wrote that, “the only way 
you can permanently and fully realize emptiness is if you 
transform, evolve, or develop your vehicle in the world of 
form”—which seems to imply that one must contrivedly 
undertake specific actions in order to transform what 
he referred to as “our vehicle,” rather than waiting for it 
to take place spontaneously as an effect of meditation. 
At any rate, the core problem for me continues to be 
his strong overvaluation of stage development—which 
outright conflicts with the metaphenomenological, 
metaexistential approach, and fails to account for the 
cases of child prodigies like Mingyur Dorje (the Namchö 
Tertön [nam chos gter ston; in full, nam mkha’ i chos gter 
ston] in whom Dzogchen-qua-Path initially manifested 
during childhood and whose realization soared during 
his early teens). Most important, though now he has 
claimed that Buddhahood is “not the creation but rather 
the direct recognition of an already perfectly present and 
freely given primordial Purity,” (Wilber, 2001, pp. 730-
731, as cited by Abramson, 2010) he has continued to 
explain it as the creation of a structure—which, being 
created, according to Buddhist doctrine must necessarily 
be impermanent and must necessarily pertain to samsāra. 
(Note that primordial purity is a concept employed in the 
Dzogchen teachings and borrowed by the Anuyogatantra 
of the Nyingmapa, the validity of which Wilber’s source 
rejects, and that therefore Wilber would have to choose 
between, [a] using that source for establishing the 
progressive attainment of the four kāyas and hence of the 
last four fulcra of his former system and of what now are 
the last four stages of the cognitive line of development, 
or [b] employing the concept of primordial purity that 
his source abhors and which originally pertained to the 
Dzogchen teachings, according to which the progression 
of attainment of the four kāyas occurs in an order 
contrary to the one posited by Wilber and his source.)
Furthermore, I am surprised that, right after 
asserting that Wilber does not consider that stage 
development should be pursued in addition to following 
an authentic spiritual Path, for it will be furthered by the 
meditations practiced in most spiritual Paths, Abramson 
asked himself whether I consider that, “stage development 
should be pursued in addition to following an authentic 
spiritual Path.” My surprise does not arise so much from 
the fact that the words in addition to outright contradict 
the above claim that the best way to achieve stage development 
is through the practice of meditation, as from the fact that 
throughout the papers Abramson reviewed I emphasized the 
metaphenomenological, metaexistential view, repeatedly 
making the point that so-called “stage development” has 
little to do with Awakening, and that in Dzogchen Atiyoga 
(where the recurrence of Dzogchen-qua-Path spontaneously 
brings about a most significant transformation, and where, 
as clearly shown in papers in the Beyond Mind series, this 
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recurrence can begin in children who have made very little 
stage development in Wilber’s sense) and other Paths that 
are not gradual there are no rigid stages of realization—
the only sequence the Dzogchen teachings posit being 
that of dharmakāya–sambhogakāya–nirmān. akāya,12 
which is the opposite of the one both Wilber and his 
source establish (a fact that Abramson overlooked in spite 
of being more conspicuous than many of the points of my 
system he commented on). Moreover, no Buddhist Path or 
School has ever asserted its successive stages of realization 
to necessarily manifest after the attainment of the higher 
stages of psychological development or, even less so, posited 
all-embracing developmental schemas (indeed, no such Path 
or School has ever been concerned with what nowadays is 
called developmental psychology). (Wilber V’s other lines of 
development are briefly described in the note indicated by 
the reference mark at the end of this paragraph.)13
With regard to the change undergone by 
Wilber’s structural approach to cognitive and spiritual 
development, Abramson (2010) cited Michael Daniels’ 
(2009) account:
What [Wilber] is saying is [that he was] wrong [in] 
that he made the mistake—and he admits this very 
explicitly in the book—of simply adding the stages 
of the Eastern meditation techniques on top of the 
stages of the Western psychological model. And he 
says it almost flippantly in the book:
So … what we did was simply to take the 
highest stage in Western psychological models 
… and then take the three or four major stages 
of meditation (gross, subtle, causal, nondual) … 
and stack those stages on top of the other stages 
… East and West integrated! (Wilber, 2007, p. 
88)
However, Wilber V retains and further develops 
his and Don Beck’s version of spiral dynamics as a 
paradigm of human evolution that supposedly works 
for ontogenic development as much as phylogenetic 
evolution, and thus his new system does not radically 
break away from the structural developmental paradigm 
criticized above. The paradigm in question is based on 
the theory of memes as defined by biologist Richard 
Dawkins, about which biology Professor H. Allen Orr 
(2004) wrote (in Carlson, n.d.):14
the selfish meme view hasn’t led anywhere. Where 
are the puzzling phenomena that have been 
explained by memes? Dawkins provides no examples 
and I suspect there aren’t any. The truth is that 
the meme idea, though a quarter-century old, has 
inspired next to no serious research and has failed to 
establish a place for itself in mainstream cognitive 
science, psychology, or sociology. Though laymen 
often have the impression that scientific ideas die 
in decisive experiments, far more often they die 
because they didn’t suggest many experiments. They 
failed, that is, to inspire a rich research program. 
Though I could obviously be proved wrong, and 
while I have no problem with the notion that some 
science of cultural change may be possible, I’m far 
less confident than Dawkins that memes will play 
an important role in any such enterprise.
As Richard Carlson (n.d.) has suggested 
(substantiating his view in a most informed manner), 
Wilber’s and Cowan’s evolutionary views seem to stem 
from their right wing, elitist political stance—which 
as such, I feel compelled to add, could hardly be more 
anti-ecological. Since this is not the place to carry out a 
detailed discussion of this subject (a longer one, though 
not exhaustive, will appear in the upcoming definitive 
version of my Beyond History [Capriles, 2007a, Vol. III], 
where I scrupulously draw an ecophilosophy of history 
and political ecophilosophy), suffice to note that Wilber’s 
paradigmatic example of an “integral politician” is Tony 
Blair—whose “integrity” revealed itself in his lying to the 
UK Parliament in order to falsely substantiate his plans 
to invade Iraq and unleash the spree of destruction that 
killed hundreds of thousands of Iraqis and gravely affected 
our planet’s ecosystem (not only through the CO2 added 
to the atmosphere, but even more so through the use of 
depleted uranium warheads that has multiplied cancer 
incidence rates among Iraqi children). Moreover, Wilber 
spoke of George W. Bush (“even if one does not agree 
with him”) and the (far less extremist) General Colin 
Powell approvingly—in this way implicitly justifying the 
aggression to the Iraqi people they engineered, as well 
as Bush’s environmental policies (including his drive to 
drill in Alaska and all the rest), and so on. Also, instead 
of outlining a green political program, he has favored 
the achievement of a synthesis of the views of two of 
U.S. Presidents who refused to sign the Kyoto Protocol 
(one of whom, besides, was responsible for unleashing 
the Iraq war) and those of Blair’s and of politicians from 
other countries in order to 
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find a “Third Way” that unites the best of liberal 
and conservative—President Clinton’s Vital Center, 
George W. Bush’s Compassionate Conservatism, 
Germany’s Neue Mitte [uniting Gerhard Schroeder 
and Angela Merkel], Tony Blair’s Third Way, and 
Thabo Mbeki’s African Renaissance, to name a few. 
(Wilber, 2000, n.p.)
How can Wilber, in spite of the Bush 
administration’s environmental, social, and international 
record, reproduce G. W. Bush’s Newspeak categorization 
of his own stance as “Compassionate Conservatism”? 
Wilber ads have referred to him as the “Einstein of 
consciousness;” it seems to me that the above suggests 
that a more correct label for him would be that of the 
“[Yoshihiro Francis] Fukuyama of consciousness”15 (with 
regard with Wilber’s political ideas and, in particular, 
the war in Iraq, cf. also Wilber, 2009).
As to Wilber V’s structural developmental and 
evolutionary paradigm, in his diagram and exposition of 
his view of ontogenic unfolding (Wilber, 2007), the first 
line of development is the cognitive one, which, building 
on Piaget, has as its lowest rung the sensorimotor; as 
its second rung, the preoperational / symbolic; as the 
third, the preoperational / conceptual; as the fourth, 
the concrete operational; as the fifth, the formal 
operational; and as the sixth, that of early vision-logic, 
which he categorized as metasystemic—these six, and 
the stages at the same level in all other lines, occupying 
the diagram’s first tier. Then the seventh rung is named 
middle vision-logic, categorized as paradigmatic, and 
the eighth is labeled late vision-logic and declared to be 
cross-paradigmatic—these two filling the second tier. 
Following that—in the third tier—what one finds is 
no more than a repeat of the preceding Wilber, for the 
ninth, called global mind, is no other than what Wilber 
previously called the psychic level; the tenth is meta-
mind, which is what he formerly called the subtle level; 
the eleventh is overmind, which is no other than what 
he previously called the causal level; and the twelfth is 
the supermind, which is what he formerly called the 
nondual (the names of the last two rungs having been 
used by “integral” Master Śrī Aurobindo—to whose left-
wing social concerns and proposals, as Carlson [n.d.] has 
noted, Wilber has never alluded16).
So it is clear that, as noted above, in spite of 
the greater flexibility of his newer model, and in spite 
of the above-quoted self-criticism of admitting that 
he had taken the highest stage in models of Western 
developmental psychology and then stacked (what he 
viewed as) the three or four major stages of meditation on 
top of it, Wilber is still positing a schema of hierarchical 
structures, and is still adding what he apparently believes 
to be the final stages of realization in higher Buddhism, 
Vedānta, Integral Yoga and so on, to what he holds to be 
the standard stages of cognitive ontogenic development. 
Yet his final stages of realization are at odds with higher 
Buddhism, as systematically explained in the Beyond 
Mind papers. In fact, Wilber has continued to wrongly 
identify the final four levels in the ontogenic, cognitive 
line of development—which as just noted continue to 
be the four last fulcra of his preceding schema—with 
the four kāyas as these are said to successively occur in 
vehicles of the Path of Transformation. This amounts 
to the negation of the possibility of attaining the far 
higher realizations of Dzogchen Atiyoga, for as shown 
in the Beyond Mind papers, the Ati Path of spontaneous 
liberation begins with a Direct Introduction to the 
condition that the Path of Transformation calls 
svabhāvikāya and posits as its last, final attainment, 
but which on the Path of Ati is no more than the 
precondition of its practice, and which in the Menngagde 
or Upadeśavarga series of teachings, is prior both to the 
practice of Tekchö (khregs chod) that establishes the 
dharmakāya and to the subsequent practice of Thögel 
(thod rgal) that establishes the sambhogakāya and that 
at the end begets the nirmān. akāya—thus establishing 
the Atiyoga svabhāvikāya (which signifies that the 
sambhogakāya and nirmān. akāya of Dzogchen Ati are 
levels of realization that stand far beyond the final level 
of realization of the inner Tantras of Transformation 
and by no means can be attained through the methods 
of these Tantras; Namkhai Norbu, n.p.; Capriles, 2000, 
2003, 2006, 2009, in press). The fact that Wilber has 
completely overlooked the Dzogchen kāyas and the 
sequence in which they manifest, even though he seems 
to acknowledge Atiyoga to be the highest Path, is most 
strange, to say the least. 
In the last pages of Abramson’s (2010) paper, 
the author recurrently reiterated the assertion that the 
previous last four fulcra that are now the last four levels 
of the cognitive line of development, do correspond to 
the four kāyas as progressively realized on the Tantric 
Path of Transformation. True enough, as clearly stated 
in the Beyond Mind papers, a sequence of realization 
beginning with nirmān. akāya, continuing with 
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sambhogakāya and then dharmakāya, and concluding 
in the svabhāvikāya that consists in the indivisibility of 
the first three kāyas, is posited in the Buddhist Tantras 
of the Path of Transformation. It is surprising that 
Abramson overlooked the fact, which I strongly stressed 
in the Beyond Mind papers and which I intend to 
emphasize again at this point (rather than merely noting 
that Wilber overlooked the sequence of realization of the 
kāyas characteristic of the supreme vehicle and posited 
a sequence characteristic of lower vehicles), that Wilber 
described the kāyas in a way that is at odds with the 
conception and explanation of those kāyas proper to the 
Tantras that make up Path of Transformation. As to how 
he produced such a bizarre concoction, I had found no 
clue in his works (including Wilber, 1995, 1996, which 
were my sources for my critique of what formerly were 
his last four fulcra). However, Abramson’s (2010) reply 
to the Beyond Mind papers (Capriles, 2000c, 2006, 
2009), mentioned the name of the author that, in the 
second edition of his 1995 book Sex, Ecology, Spirituality 
(Wilber 2001b)—to which I have not had access so 
far17—Wilber gave as the source for his understanding 
of the kāyas, and reproduced some passages by Wilber 
(2001b) in which he cited the source in question. I 
must admit I was shocked, for the name Wilber gave is 
that of the most controversial character within Tibetan 
Buddhism.19 The mention of this source can offer the 
occasion for pointing out two of the genuine problems 
with his concoction:
(1) The first is that Wilber’s descriptions of the 
fulcra he identified with the kāyas fail to match the way 
the latter are described in the Anuttarayogatantras and 
in the writings of Je Tsongkhapa—the latter being, 
as repeatedly stated, the source of the controversial 
character that Wilber claimed to have taken as his source. 
Among the views of Wilber that I have denounced as 
failures, there is a particular one, however, that could 
be explained by the fact that Wilber drew from that 
particular source—namely his description of the 
svābhāvikāya. In fact, contradicting his predecessors in 
the rest of the Tibetan Buddhist traditions, Tsongkhapa 
asserted the svābhāvikāya / Buddhahood to involve the 
perception of relative reality. The reason for this oddity 
is Tsongkhapa’s peculiar understanding of Prāsangika 
Mādhyamaka, according to which entities are not empty 
of their being this or that entity (and hence they are the 
entity referred to by their names), but only of inherent / 
hypostatic / reified existence, and hence after delusion 
were eradicated, there would still be a relative reality 
comprising men, women, horses, trees, mountains, 
pillars, tables, and the rest of phenomena (lam rim chen 
mo, passim; cf. Thakchoe, 2007, pp. 48-53), yet no relative 
phenomenon whatsoever would be misperceived as 
inherently / hypostatically existing.20 Since Tsongkhapa 
and his followers assert relative reality to persist after the 
eradication of delusion, they relativize Buddhahood by 
claiming that in it relative and ultimate truth manifest 
simultaneously (cf., for example, Thakchoe, 2007, pp. 
46-58; also ff.)—being, in fact, the only important 
Buddhists who, so far as I know, uphold this view. (Note 
that I am not implying that the continuum of sensory 
appearances dissolves upon Awakening; what actually 
happens is that Buddhas no longer experience any 
segment of the sensory continuum as being this or that, 
yet they can certainly pinpoint this or that, and make far 
more precise distinctions than ordinary beings—their 
verbal expressions being other-directed assertions (Tib. 
zhenngo khelen [gzhan ngo khas len],21 which means that 
they make them without believing them from the heart 
to be either true or false.)
However, the above does not account for the rest 
of the odd explanation of the kāyas and their sequence of 
manifestation in the Anuttarayogatantras that Wilber gave 
in his peculiar description of his last four fulcra, for no one 
within Tibetan Buddhism would assert the nirmān. akāya 
to be realized when, while contemplating nature and 
without any apparent reason, the feeling of separateness 
spontaneously dissolves for a while (whether this means 
that the illusion that a mental subject separate from nature 
is perceiving the latter has dissolved, or that the mental 
subject has identified with the object), as Wilber did in 
his discussion of fulcrum 7 / gross mysticism; moreover, 
Wilber’s description of this fulcrum and corresponding 
type of mysticism in part fits the experiences of the 
samsaric formless realms that are the first stage in the 
arising of sam. sāra from the neutral condition of base-of-
all and in part fits the neutral condition in question, both 
of which, as shown again and again, are non-nirvanic 
conditions that are often mistaken for the dharmakāya 
(for the confusion of the experiences of the formless 
realms with the dharmakāya, cf. Kyeme Dechen [skye 
med bde chen] and Karma Thinle [kar ma phrin las]’s 
notes to Saraha [in Guenther, 1973]; for the confusion 
of the dharmakāya with the base-of-all, cf. the cite from 
Kunkhyen Jigme Lingpa [“all-knowing”; kun mkhyen jigs 
med gling pa] in Guenther, 1977, pp. 142-147: “Those who 
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do not understand it in this way and take the base-of-all for 
the dharmakāya are like blind men without a guide, erring 
about in a desert. As they are deluded about the nature of 
the Base and the Fruit, the Path by which Buddhahood 
can be realized in one lifetime has been blocked. Samaya.” 
Note that the all-knowing teacher prophesied that this 
confusion would be a common error in our time)—yet are 
never mistaken for the nirmān. akāya, for which what are 
often mistaken are specific experiences of higher regions of 
the samsaric realm of sensuality (cf. Kyeme Dechen’s and 
Karma Thinle’s commentaries to Saraha, in Guenther, 
1973) or the consciousness of defilements (in the sense the 
Dzogchen teachings give the term in the same context) 
that precedes experience of the realm of sensuality in the 
arising of sam.  sāra from the base-of-all. 
For its part, Wilber’s description of his fulcrum 
8 / subtle mysticism fails to distinguish between the 
sambhogakāya, the experiences of the samsaric realm 
of form (cf. Kyeme Dechen’s and Karma Thinle’s 
commentaries to Saraha, in Guenther, 1973), and the 
consciousness of the base-of-all (kun gzhi rnam shes or kun 
gzhi rnam par shes pa; Skt. ālayavijñāna) that immediately 
precedes the latter in the arising of sam.  sāra from the 
neutral base-of-all (in the sense the Dzogchen teachings 
give the term in this context). 
Also, Wilber’s description of his fulcrum 9 
/ causal mysticism (a term that could hardly be more 
absurd, as the dharmakāya with which he identifies it 
is that which has no cause and cannot be itself a cause), 
and which he categorized as formless, fails to distinguish 
between the dharmakāya, the experiences of the samsaric 
formless realms, and instances of the base-of-all in the 
Dzogchen sense of a condition where neither sam.  sara 
nor nirvān. a are active—to which, as shown in the 
discussion of these fulcra in the last two of the Beyond 
Mind papers and as may be inferred from a passage from a 
Mahāyāna scriptural source quoted in that discussion, both 
the nirodhasamāpatti and many of the nirvikalpa samādhis 
he gives as cases of this fulcrum pertain: the dharmakāya 
is not a condition of nirodha or cessation in the sense of 
lack of manifestation or blankness,22 and in particular no 
one would assert it to correspond to the nirodhasamāpatti 
that according to the Theravāda pertains to nirvān. a. (In 
what regards Wilber’s categorization of the dharmakāya 
as a formless condition, I concede that it may derive from 
Anuttarayogatantra descriptions of the arising of the clear 
light that follows the dissolution of the winds in the central 
channel—which Tsongkhapa explained as the emergence 
of “the most subtle mind of clear light”—after the stopping 
of the coarse levels of consciousness. However, that in 
Anuttarayogatantra the kāya in question may initially 
manifests in a formless, luminous condition does not at 
all imply that it may be reduced to a formless, luminous 
condition—just as the fact that satori (Chin.–Hànyǔ 
Pīnyīn, wù; Wade-Giles, wu) may manifest following kōan 
(Chin. Hànyǔ Pīnyīn, gōng’àn; Wade-Giles kung-an) study 
does not mean it may be categorized as an event that occurs 
following kōan study. In the same way, that coarse levels of 
consciousness stop in the Anuttarayogatantras’ realization 
of the dharmakāya does not at all mean that the latter may 
be reduced to the nirodhasamāpatti of the Theravādin 
tradition: the Mahāyāna Sūtras, Śāstras and so on make 
it clear that in the vehicle in question nirodhasamāpatti 
constitutes a deviation.)
In general, many other aspects of Wilber’s 
descriptions of the kāyas are not based on the teachings 
of any reputed Buddhist author and Master—and, in 
general, the descriptions in question are blatantly self-
contradictory, and the universalization of the sequence 
of their arising as explained in the Tantras of the Path 
of Transformation is wholly unwarranted. Thus it is a 
fact that Wilber has continued to reproduce many of the 
mix-ups denounced in the assessment of these fulcra in 
the last two Beyond Mind papers (Capriles, 2006, 2009), 
which thus fail to correspond to the higher Buddhist 
realizations with which he has identified them—or to 
stages in other ancient, traditional systems directed at 
Awakening, whether Buddhist or non-Buddhist, for 
that matter. In Wilber V, Wilber has continued to piece 
together elements from different traditions—not only 
from different religions, but also from different Buddhist 
vehicles and schools, thus being comparable to one who, 
by piecing together the head of an elephant, a snake’s 
body, and a human intellect, produces a monster existing 
solely in his or her imagination. (Finally, as clearly stated 
in the Beyond Mind papers and the book collecting the 
points made in them, if Wilber follows the source he 
mentions, then he should flatly reject the validity of the 
Dzogchen teachings and the Anuyogatantra, as surely 
does that source, and by the same token he should shun 
the Nyingma, Kagyu, Sakya, and Jonangpa [jo nang 
pa] teachings as a whole, because—as illustrated with a 
quote from Kunchen Pema Karpo and another one from 
Gorampa in this reply—these agree that in Buddhahood 
only the absolute truth manifests, as the relative no 
longer does so.)
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 (2) Since, as noted repeatedly, Wilber’s source 
followed Je Tsongkhapa’s peculiar understanding 
of Mādhyamaka Prāsangika, his view of emptiness 
outright contradicts his source’s. In fact, Je Tsongkhapa 
regarded as ultimate truth emptiness qua emptiness of 
self-existence (Skt. svabhāva śūnyatā; Tib. rangzhingyi 
tongpanyi [rang bzhing gyis stong pa nyid]—except in Je 
Tsongkhapa, who preferred to render it as rangzhingyi 
madrubpa [rang bzhin gyis ma grub pa]: the term 
criticized in Gendün Chöphel, 2005; Gendün Chöphel 
& Capriles, in press; Chin. Hànyǔ Pīnyīn, zìxìngkòng; 
Chin. Wade-Giles, tzu-hsing-k’ung; Jap. jishōkū) as 
true ultimate truth (Skt. śūnyatā; Tib. tongpanyi [stong 
pa nyid]; Chin. Hànyǔ Pīnyīn, kòng; Chin. Wade-
Giles, k’ung; Jap. kū). However, unlike Wilber, nearly 
all Tibetan Prāsangika Masters except for his followers, 
and the Dzogchen teachings, Tsongkhapa defined 
emptiness as the absence of inherent existence23—that is, 
as the absence of the mistaken mode of existence that 
deluded beings project on what he himself called merely 
existing phenomena (a concept not found in the original 
Prāsangika teachings),24 thereby experiencing the latter as 
existing intrinsically, in their own right—and claimed that 
the ultimate truth as it manifests on the Path consisted in 
getting this absence of inherent existence to become present 
to the meditator (i.e., to become an object of cognition) 
in the practice of insight (Skt. vipaśyanā; Tib. lhantong 
[lhag mthong]; Chin. Hànyǔ Pīnyīn, guān; Wade-Giles, 
kuan; Jap. kan) meditation that he taught in the Lamrim 
Chenmo and the other Lamrim books. Furthermore, as 
already noted, since a mere absence cannot bear or create 
anything, this view frontally contradicts Wilber’s (2007) 
view of emptiness as a creative principle that generates 
all there is and hence as being the same as Ayin25—a 
view that Wilber V reiterated as follows:
the signifier Ayin or Emptiness has a real referent 
as disclosed by injunctive paradigm. That is, those 
who are qualified to make the judgment agree that it 
can be said that, among other things, Spirit is a vast 
infinite Abyss or Emptiness [experienced through 
first-person perspective in a causal state],26 out of 
which all things arise. (p. 268)
Let me emphasize once more that the phenomena 
of sam.  sāra and the qualities of nirvān. a cannot be borne 
or created by a mere absence (of inherent existence or 
whatever) such as Tsongkhapa’s emptiness. Moreover, 
Wilber wrote (Wilber & Cohen, 2005, p. 3), “emptiness 
or the unborn or the changeless ground,” thus implying 
emptiness and what he called the “unborn changeless 
ground” to be the same. Though this is permissible 
in a Mahāyāna context (and in fact Ju Mipham’s use 
of the term emptiness in that context is not at odds 
with the concept of ground), changeless ground seems 
to be Wilber’s term for Dzogchen-qua-Base, which is 
not emptiness, for the latter (in a specific sense of the 
term) is no more than one of its aspects (in the twofold 
classification, it is its primordial purity aspect (Tib. 
katak [ka dag]), which in the threefold classification 
corresponds to the essence (Tib. ngowo [ngo bo]) aspect, 
and which is the aspect that somehow may be said to 
be changeless—the other aspect being its spontaneous 
perfection (Tib. lhundrub [lhun grub]), which subdivides 
into the nature (Tib. rangzhin [rang bzhin]) and energy 
(Tib. thukjé [thugs rje]) aspects. Moreover, Tsongkhapa 
rejected the concept of a Base, and therefore his ultra-
orthodox followers (which is surely how the controversial 
character Wilber gave as his source for his last four fulcra 
sees himself) would wholeheartedly reject it as well.
Therefore, Wilber is clearly at odds with his 
main sources—including both the Dzogchen teachings 
and the controversial Tibetan character. In fact, 
Wilber’s emptiness is in tune with the Daoist concept of 
nothingness (Chin. Hànyǔ Pīnyīn, wú; Wade-Giles wu; 
Jap. mu) and the Chán / Zen concept of the Great Void 
(Chin. Hànyǔ Pīnyīn, dàwù; Wade-Giles, ta-wu). This 
concept seems to roughly correspond to the one expressed 
by the Skt. mahāśūnya (Tib. tongpa chenpo [stong pa chen 
po]), as well as to that of the dharmadhātu (Tib. chöjing 
[chos dbyings] or chökyijing [chos kyi dbyings])—which, 
however, in Chinese is (Hànyǔ Pīnyīn) fajiè or (Wade-
Giles) fa-chieh—which are anathema to Tsongkhapa 
and hence must be so to Wilber’s source as well—and 
to some extent with the primordial purity (Tib. katak [ka 
dag]) or essence (Tib. ngowo [ngo bo]) aspect of the Base 
in the Dzogchen teachings,27 which, as noted above, 
Tsongkhapa rejected (note that the Dzogchen teachings 
compare the Base’s essence aspect to the no-thing-ness of 
a mirror in the sense of being that which allows awareness 
to fill itself with appearances and nonetheless continue 
to [be] no-thing-ness—which for its part implies that 
phenomena that manifest in this way are empty of self-
existence). The point here is that if one disagrees with 
an author as to what the ultimate truth is and how it 
manifests, it is absurd to take him or her as an authority 
with regard to the way realization develops, for there is 
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no reason to assume that realization and its imitation—
or two different kinds of realization, for that matter—
must develop in the same way. Moreover, Wilber did 
not even follow his source faithfully, for as he quoted 
from the latter, he added his own terms within brackets, 
seemingly in order to twist the controversial author’s 
assertions in order to make them fit his own views.28 
Abramson (2010) went on with his attempts to 
vindicate Wilber:
While Capriles correctly pointed out that the 
nirmanakaya, the sambhogakaya, and the dharma-
kaya do not fit Wilber’s model, it is interesting to note 
that Wilber’s definition of the Subtle and Causal levels 
provide a possible explanation for this being so. For 
example, in Capriles’ critique of Wilber’s inclusion 
of nirmanakaya in his psychic (i.e., lower subtle) 
level, Capriles implied that while nirmanakaya may 
manifest in the gross level (which Wilber’s psychic 
level relates to), it is also of the nondual level in the 
sense it is Buddha’s body. Similarly this applies to 
the sambhogakaya, and the dharmakaya. Cosmic 
consciousness is another example of a spiritual state 
that Wilber asserts to be in his psychic level, but 
does not, for the same reason as above, appear to fit 
there. This can be deduced from Daniels’ (2005, pp. 
200-202) discussion of its apparent misfit where he 
pointed out that, although cosmic consciousness may 
manifest in the psychic level in the sense that it relates 
only to gross phenomena and not to the subtle or 
causal domains, it is otherwise indistinguishable from 
“One Taste” or “Ultimate” nondual consciousness 
which is of the nondual. Thus Capriles’ objection to 
Wilber’s ascribing nirmanakaya, sambhogakaya, and 
dharmakaya to the psychic, subtle, and causal realms 
respectively can be reframed as a critique of the 
inherent limitations of Wilber’s definition of these 
levels. But equally, Wilber might claim that most 
of the spiritual states that he asserts belong to these 
realms are correctly placed because they do relate to 
his definitions of those realms; in other words, the 
above examples appear to be the limited exception. 
(p. 184)
The above reduces my denunciation of the 
mismatch between Wilber’s last four fulcra and that 
which the Anuttarayogatantra sees as the four kāyas to 
its most insignificant aspect, for it overlooks the major, 
radical mismatches denounced in my exhaustive and 
long critique of these fulcra—a few of which were 
reviewed in point (1) above in this reply—and reduces 
the denunciation in question to its least significant and 
striking aspect, namely that “while nirmanakaya may 
manifest in the gross level (which Wilber’s psychic level 
relates to), it is also of the nondual level in the sense it is 
Buddha’s body, [and] this applies to the sambhogakāya, 
and the dharmakāya.” As to whether or not Wilber 
faithfully follows the most controversial character he 
takes as the source for the last four fulcra in Wilber IV and 
the last four stages of the line of cognitive development 
in Wilber V (including those reproduced in Abramson, 
2010), I decided to abstain from determining, as this 
would require me to read the books by the character in 
question—which I will not waste my time in doing, and 
which I do not advise others to do.29
Wilber has also continued to maintain the 
supposed equivalence between the “three great states 
of consciousness” which are waking, dreaming, and 
dreamless sleep, and the “three great realms of being” 
he has posited, which are gross, subtle, and causal—a 
thesis that I refuted in a most clear way in the last two 
Beyond Mind papers (Capriles, 2006, 2009)—and 
in general he has continued to overlook the crucial 
difference between the samsaric formless realms, the 
neutral condition of the base-of-all, and the nonstatic 
nirvān. a of higher Buddhist vehicles (which he does 
not even refer to in his writings, for he always reduced 
nirvān. a to the Therevadan nirodhasamāpatti and still 
continues to do so), which throughout the three Beyond 
Mind papers was said to be the most basic and blatant 
omission, not only of Wilber’s system, but of the whole 
of transpersonal and so-called integral theory.
Because of all of the above, Wilber readers 
who take him seriously are bound to mistake samsaric 
experiences for nirvanic levels of realization, and 
therefore be unable to proceed on any Buddhist Path. 
Consider Abramson’s (2010) explanation of Wilber V’s 
view in these regards:
Wilber’s explanation for being able to access any state 
from any stage of development starts with pointing 
out, “… the three great states of consciousness 
(waking, dreaming, sleeping) are said to correspond 
with the three great realms of being (gross, subtle, 
causal) … an idea found in … Vajrayana” (Wilber, 
2002a, p. 1). According to Wilber, different worlds 
i.e. the three realms of gross, subtle and causal are 
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disclosed by different states of consciousness, and 
any different state of consciousness is potentially 
available at any time and to anyone at any stage of 
their development, because all humans have access 
to the waking, dreaming and deep sleep states. But, 
Wilber explains “stages CANNOT be skipped, 
because each stage is a component of its successor 
(this would be like going from atoms to cells and 
skipping molecules)” (ibid). Going from first person 
perspective (magical/typhonic stage) to second person 
perspective (mythic stage) to third person (rational 
stage) is a process of development where, according 
to Wilber and supported by researchers such as Jane 
Loevinger, Robert Kegan and Susanne Cook-Greuter, 
stages cannot be skipped. (Italics my own)
Moreover, the above passage demonstrates the 
fact, repeatedly referred to here, that Wilber is still positing 
a very rigid schema of hierarchical structures of the kind 
denounced throughout the Beyond Mind papers, for he 
has continued to affirm that stages cannot be skipped, 
precisely because each stage is a component of its successor—
which he compared with going from atoms to cells while 
skipping molecules. Since the structure of each of the stages 
is arisen and produced (as all structures necessarily are), as 
noted in the discussion of Wilber’s last four fulcra in the 
last two Beyond Mind papers—and no matter how many 
times he may echo the Dzogchen teachings’ assertion 
that Buddhahood, rather than a creation, production, or 
construction, is the direct, bare recognition of an already 
perfectly present condition—in Buddhist terms his last 
four fulcra or stages are produced / contrived / conditioned 
/ compounded / fabricated (Skt. samskr. ta; Pāli: san
.khata; 
Tib. düje [’ dus byas]), and as such are impermanent and 
pertain to samsāra. As to Dzogchen in particular, there 
is no need to repeat here all of the quotations offered in 
those papers to demonstrate that on the Dzogchen Path 
there is no given sequence of realization (including the 
one from a Richö by Dudjom Rinpoche and the one from 
the Tantra of the Upadeśavarga or Menngagde [Tib. man 
ngag (gyi) sde] series of teachings called The Heart Mirror 
of Vajrasattva [Tib. Dorje Sempa Nyinggi Melong (rdo rje 
sems dpa’ snying gi me long)], or the examples given that 
show realization not to depend on maturity—i.e., on 
developing structures—and hence Wilber to be wrong in 
this regard (including that of Urgyen Tulku’s teacher and 
the more striking one of Namchö Mingyur Dorje [nam 
chos mi ’gyur rdo rje]).
Abramson noted that Wilber V relinquished the 
whole idea of an independently existing Great Chain 
of Being involving different, self-existing planes of 
existence, as well as that of eternal or timeless structures 
of human consciousness.30 However, he has continued 
to posit a correspondence among the rungs in various 
lines, which seems to imply that he views them as stages 
in an overall, integral type of development—and, what 
is far worse, he has now presented this development as a 
transition from lower to higher focal points (cakra) that 
he associates to different colors in a schema that, as M. 
Alan Kazlev (n.d.) notes, is not found in any traditional 
system. Kazlev (n.d.) wrote:
[The schema in question] is not much more than 
about thirty years old; the earliest reference I know 
of is Christopher Hills’ (1977) Nuclear Evolution; 
an elaborate Integral theory that predates Wilber’s 
AQAL by several decades… . Hills’ book seems to 
have had little or no influence on the wider world, 
so Wilber’s rainbow chakras are probably based on 
pop-Osho New Age websites. (n.p.)
Abramson (2010) also noted that Wilber V no 
longer claims that higher spiritual levels can only be 
steadily attained and gone through after a considerable 
progress has been reached along different lines of 
development, or that it is impossible to “jump” from 
a low to a high spiritual level. In fact, he made the 
point that by 2006 Wilber had embraced the Wilber-
Combs lattice according to which in our present age31 
people can “advance” to any spiritual state at any stage 
of development—thus implicitly disavowing the just 
mentioned theses. Abramson (2010) cited Wilber (in 
Wilber & Cohen, 2005, p. 3):
If people get the evolutionary unfolding, they usually 
haven’t had that experience of prior emptiness or of 
the unborn or the changeless ground. And because 
of that, they tie their realization to an evolutionary 
stage. “I have to be at this stage; then I can realize.” 
And that’s not it at all, because that ever-present state 
is ever present, and you can have that realization 
virtually at any point. But in order to stabilize and 
ground it, you do indeed have to then grow and 
develop. So they just understand the evolutionary 
side of form, and the other folks tend to have the 
emptiness understood, but very rarely do you get 
emptiness together with evolutionary form.
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The phrase, of prior emptiness or of the unborn or the 
changeless ground was discussed above, where it was noted 
that Wilber’s controversial Tibetan source would not 
accept an identity between emptiness, the unborn, Ayin, 
a vast infinite Abyss, and that which Wilber imprecisely 
calls the changeless ground, or Wilber’s assertion that it 
is out of emptiness that all things arise (to begin with, 
as noted above, emptiness for Tsongkhapa consisted 
in the presence of the absence of inherent / hypostatic 
/ true existence, and mere absences simply cannot bear 
anything; likewise, he would not accept the concept 
Wilber expressed by the phrase changeless ground; etc.; cf. 
the discussion of some of the meanings of emptiness in 
the corresponding endnote [endnote 22]). As to Wilber’s 
assertion in the cited passage that in order to stabilize and 
ground realization one has to then grow and develop, it 
implies that child prodigies like Namchö Mingyur Dorje 
in a matter of months, or at most a few years, should have 
grown and developed along the various Wilberian lines of 
development as much as a normal individual does over 
many years. Above it was noted that in any individual 
who nongradually attains a genuine spiritual realization 
of higher Buddhism, selfishly-motivated actions 
gradually diminish while selfless activity for the sake 
of others increases; the psyche gradually gains in self-
consistency; the propensities for evil, self-encumbering 
and so on are gradually neutralized, and so on—yet 
none of this implies that in all Wilberian quadrants the 
individual rapidly progresses through the stages Wilber 
has posited, or that child-prodigies like Mingyur Dorje 
will not retain any infantile traits in any Wilberian 
quadrant.
As noted above, the newer Wilber admits there 
may be a somewhat freer transit between lower and 
higher levels in ontogeny as well as phylogenesis, and 
that development along one line of development does not 
need to strictly depend on development along the other 
lines. As Abramson (2010) put it:
The Wilber-Combs lattice separates states (e.g., 
psychic) and stages (e.g., typhonic-magical, mental 
egoic) into different dimensions. The psychic state 
is not therefore a higher structure of mental egoic, 
typhonic or any other stage and consequently does 
not incur the objection Kelly ascribes to it. 
This is an important development, which 
probably resulted from the huge amount of criticism 
his phylogenetic views have received (not only from 
Kelly [1998], but also from Taylor [2003, 2005] and 
many others). In fact, Wilber’s view on the phylogenetic 
evolution of both the psyche and society has shifted to a 
rather here-now perspective based on Rupert Sheldrake’s 
(1981) theories of morphogenetic fields and formative 
causation, which he formerly rejected—yet to a certain 
degree he continues to establish a parallel (which is now 
far looser) between ontogeny and phylogenesis. What is 
worse, he recently introduced a new evolutionary concept 
that is not present in any traditional spiritual system 
whatsoever—namely that a fully Awake individual in 
previous stages of human evolution would not be fully 
Awake today. His argument is as follows:
The same structure that 6000 years ago could be 
said to be fully Enlightened, is no longer so today. 
Somebody at mythic-membership today is no 
longer one with the Totality of all Form, because 
there are “over the head” of amber, the orange and 
green and teal and turquoise structures. Those are 
now real, “ontological,” actually existing structures in 
the Kosmos, as real as if they were Platonic eternal 
givens (except that they aren’t), and if a person has 
not transcended and included those levels in their 
own development, then there are major levels of 
reality that they (the amber individuals) are not one 
with. Even if they master nondual states of a perfect 
nondual union of Emptiness and Form, even if they 
master Ati Yoga and thögal (i.e., thögel [thod rgal]) 
visions and the 5 ranks of Tozan, even if they master 
centering prayer and the deepest contemplative 
states, even if they rest constantly in Ayin, they are 
not fully Enlightened: there are aspects of Form that 
never enter this person’s world, and thus—exactly 
as we were meant to explain—this person’s satori is 
oneness with a partial world. (Wilber, 2007, p. 247)
The fact that Wilber here mixes up the transient 
freedom from conditioning Japanese Zen calls satori 
(Chin. Hànyǔ Pīnyīn, wù; Wade-Giles wu) with Full 
Awakening (Chin. Hànyǔ Pīnyīn, pútí; Chin. Wade-
Giles, p’u-t’ i; Jap. bodai), which is an irreversible 
condition, is irrelevant to the thread of the present 
discussion. What is important is that the above is an 
example of the extreme structural paradigm criticized 
throughout the Beyond Mind papers as well as in the 
upcoming book systematizing the arguments of those 
papers, for Awakening, rather than a structure, is 
absolute freedom from conditioning by structures, and 
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at any rate, even if one accepted the thesis that at each new 
stage of the cognitive or spiritual evolution of the human 
species new structures arise, Awakening would not consist 
in including all structures arisen in human beings at a 
particular time, as it lies in having come to See through 
all that is arisen, into the absolute equality of the unborn in 
which arisen structures are irrelevant—for one is no longer 
conditioned by any such structure—and having come 
to dwell irreversibly, uninterruptedly in this realization. 
Although I am not against comparing Awakening as it 
manifests in people of different ages whose psyches are 
differently structured, this would by no means lead to the 
conclusion that one who is Awake in a less structured age 
will not be Awake in a more structured era just because 
in the more structured epoch there are aspects of Form 
that never enter her or his world. In fact, for someone who 
is fully Awake today there will be aspects of Form that 
never enter his or her world, such as forms manifesting in 
other planets (whether in our solar system or in those solar 
systems that have been recently discovered) that might be 
discovered in the future: will he or she not be fully Awake 
just because those aspects of Form do not enter her or his 
world? Awakening consists, not in being one with the whole 
of Form existing in one’s lifetime—even though it no doubt 
involves nonduality with whatever manifests in experience 
(including all that may have to do with the imagery 
characteristic of the individual’s time), and freedom 
from conditioning by it—but simply in being free from 
the three types of avidyā listed in Dzogchen teachings. 
Thus also this Wilberian thesis reveals his outlook to be 
metaphenomenologically ascending and as such to be a case 
of what Trungpa Rinpoche called spiritual materialism, 
for it asserts Awakening to lie in embracing produced, 
conditioned structures, rather than acknowledging it to 
consist in the irreversible realization of the unproduced, 
unconditioned absolute nature. Furthermore, there is no 
reason to assume the existence of the structures Wilber 
has posited—yet I do not intend to assess each of them in 
order to accept it or reject it. (Note that those Buddhists 
who take the concept of the omniscience of Buddhahood 
literally would object that Buddhas are aware of whatever 
happens in other planets, but on the other hand would 
believe that Buddhas are aware of structures in the psyche 
that would arise in humans in the future, and therefore 
would claim that they integrate both the knowledge of 
whatever happens in other planets and the structures 
that will arise in humans of the future—thus discarding 
Wilber’s thesis in this regard.)
It seems to me an outrageous expression of 
modern hubris to believe that one who becomes Awake 
today has a better or more complete realization than 
one who became Awake 6000 years ago. Moreover, as it 
follows from Carlson’s (n.d.), most valuable reflections, 
in Wilber’s case this thesis—just as the rest of his rigid 
evolutionary schema—seems to be motivated by a 
pronounced right wing political stand. I was shocked and 
surprised that Wilber (2007, p. 98), rather than trying 
to guess what were the reasons that led the Dalai Lama 
to make a certain statement that in all lights was made 
from the standpoint of some specific others and in order 
to respond to what he felt were their needs, and thus as 
what Candrakīrti, and then Jayānanda, Gorampa and 
others, called an “other-directed assertion” (i.e., without 
himself adhering either to his own assertion or to an 
alternative one; cf. the upcoming definitive editions of 
Capriles, 2004, 2005), dared to assert the lofty spiritual 
/ political leader to have an ethnocentric worldview,32 for 
by so doing he implicitly placed himself in a spiritual 
place above H.H.’s, from which he can accurately judge 
him. I wonder whether this has to do with the fact that 
the Dalai Lama’s political stance as an engaged Buddhist 
(and even as a Marxist, as documented in the upcoming 
book synthesizing the ideas expressed in the Beyond 
Mind papers) conflicts with Wilber’s decidedly right 
wing stance, or whether the latter was conditioned by 
the anti-Dalai Lama drive orchestrated by the Tibetan 
character he took as the source for his sequence of 
realization (for understanding the reasons for this, cf. 
Clifton with Miller, 1997, and Bultrini, 2008).33
The same characteristic modern hubris and his 
right wing stance seem to be patent in Wilber’s claim 
that true ecological awareness can only result from 
attaining a “high stage of evolution” like the one that 
in his view humans can finally attain in the current 
time. As Abramson (2010) admited, Wilber (2007) has 
continued to hold that:
the comprehension of more complex aspects of 
samsara will require correspondingly higher stages 
of development e.g. the appreciation of ecosystems 
will only “appear” to someone at a high enough (i.e. 
post-conventional) stage of development. Thus only 
people at post-conventional stage development will 
be prone to make sacrifices to tackle the ecological 
crisis because people at “lower” stages will not 
recognise the problem.
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Realization has nothing to do with making 
sacrifices (whether in order to tackle the ecological crisis 
or with any other purpose); what it does is to dissolve 
the delusion (and hence the structures, perspectives, 
and attitudes) at the root of ecological crisis, so that the 
individual spontaneously, actionlessly works toward the 
changes necessary for healing the ecosystem. In the same 
way, as research by P. Descola (1986, 1996), cited in 
some of the Beyond Mind papers and in the upcoming 
book with the materials of these suggests, primal 
human beings cared for the environment for hundreds 
of thousands of years—at least until the time of the 
earliest registered ecocides—without this involving a 
sacrifice, for they seem to have neither objectified 
the physical reality nor experienced it as inherently 
alien to themselves, and to have been keenly aware of 
interconnections—and therefore their spontaneous 
responses to that reality improved biodiversity rather than 
destroying it. My view is that the same would be the case 
after the spiritual and social regeneration that I hope will 
result from the completion of the reductio ad absurdum 
of threefold avidyā achieved in ecological crisis. There is 
no phylogenetic progress over the ages, just as ontogenic 
development need not amount to betterment. Abramson 
(2010) wrote:
Capriles points to the central premise of Wilber’s 
theories of spiritual attainment i.e. they are based 
on developmental steps leading to Nondual state of 
Suchness, where some minimum level of attainment 
of each development step must occur before one can 
move to the next step. Capriles powerfully refutes 
this throughout his three part “Beyond the Mind”34 
work (that commenced publication in 2000 and 
concluded in 2009). This refutation draws on the 
doctrines of Dzogchen Buddhism according to which 
true Awakening results only from the spontaneous 
liberation of delusion. This spontaneous liberation, 
Capriles explains, will manifest generally among 
humans at the end of the current cycle of evolution 
by the mechanism of reductio ad absurdum. Prior 
to this the only mechanism for true Awakening is 
an authentic spiritual path such as Dzogchen. The 
spontaneous liberation of delusion which can manifest 
in practitioners of an authentic path can occur at 
any stage of development and Awakening, which can 
follow repeated occurrences of spontaneous liberation 
of delusion, can also occur at any stage of development. 
Remarkably, considering Wilber had held the 
above view for at least two decades, by 2006 he 
had admitted it was wrong and his current theories, 
which make use of the Wilber-Combs lattice, imply 
he is in agreement with Capriles insofar as people in 
our present age35 can advance to any spiritual state at 
any stage of their development.
Abramson implied that I claim that spontaneous 
liberation will manifest generally among humans at the 
end of the current cycle of evolution as a result of the 
mechanism of reductio ad absurdum, without there 
being a need for them to follow an authentic spiritual 
path such as Dzogchen—which I have never claimed, 
as to do so would amount to making a prophesy, which 
is something I leave to those who consider themselves 
prophets (if I had to bet, however, I would bet that 
people would still need a Path in order to have access to 
spontaneous liberation). What is worse, his words give 
the impression that Wilber and I share the same view 
on human evolution, when in truth he enthusiastically 
adheres to the version of the myth of progress that 
modern hubris (in this case in its right wing version) uses 
to sustain its structured belief-system, whereas I espouse 
the contrary, traditional view of social and spiritual 
human evolution as gradual degeneration common 
to Dzogchen and Tantric Buddhism, as well as to all 
traditions having the teachings of Shenrab Miwoche 
as their root.36 Likewise, Abramson (2010) seems to 
assume that Wilber has a genuine ecological concern, 
and implies that I share this concern with him. He wrote:
Capriles’ concern with ecological issues is clear:
The spiritual systems I practice and propound, as 
all metaphenomenologically / metaexistentially 
descending Paths, are perfectly nondual; yet … 
[also] descending in … [the senses that]… they 
have always been profoundly concerned with 
ecological, social, economic, political, gender, 
generational, cultural, and other related issues 
(Capriles, 2009 pp. 7-8)
Wilber and I may coincide in claiming that at 
some point humankind will have a relatively free, easy 
access to the unconcealment of our true condition, yet he 
apparently views this as an unprecedented occurrence, 
whereas I regard it as the recovery of a capacity that 
most likely was common to human beings of high 
Antiquity—and my divergence from Wilber about the 
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conditions that would make this possible and the time 
at which it would become possible could hardly be more 
pronounced. In fact, I claim that, due to the discrepancy 
between the digital, secondary process code of the left 
cerebral hemisphere, and the analog, primary process 
code of the right cerebral hemisphere, the interaction of 
the two cerebral hemispheres causes delusion to gradually 
increase in the course of the time cycle, making it ever 
more difficult for delusion to dissolve in Communion 
and making its evil effects ever more pronounced, until 
the point is reached at which it becomes evident that 
the effects of human actions on the ecological, social, 
psychological, and other planes are the opposite of 
those that were intended, and hence that the actions in 
question stem from delusion. By the time the ecological 
crisis is near from reaching the point of no return—thus 
showing human attempts to build a technological Eden 
to have been based on the basic human delusion called 
avidyā—psychological functioning in terms of delusion 
has been impaired in the human species as a whole to 
a considerable degree, and hence also on this plane the 
empirical reductio ad absurdum of delusion has been 
achieved—as a result of which an easier, freer access to 
the state of Communion may be restored and hence the 
structures and functioning that developed in the course 
of degenerative evolution can repeatedly dissolve in 
Dzogchen-qua-Path, thus gradually diluting themselves. 
Now, since there is no guarantee that the chaos that the 
exacerbation of delusion will produce in all fields, rather 
than bringing about the extinction of our species, will 
restore our access to the state of Communion and thus 
bring about our regeneration, one must keep from turning 
speculation into prophesy. The only thing known for 
sure is that, given the current degree of disruption of the 
global ecosystem, the disjunctive between regeneration 
and destruction is presently being reached.
The Fukuyama of purportedly “ecological” 
thinking (Wilber), on the contrary, has claimed that the 
restoration of a freer, easier access of our species to the 
unconcealment of our true condition, will occur when 
our spiritual evolution makes us develop the “required 
structures,” and that this will occur in the far future—
overlooking, in a seeming purposeful way,37 the fact that 
if the radical, total transformation that is the condition 
of possibility of human survival and of the beginning of 
a new era of spirituality, wisdom, harmony, fulfillment, 
and equality fails to occur in the very near future, in the 
short term human society will disintegrate, we will face 
unprecedented calamities and, most likely, our species 
will put an end to its own existence. One may even come 
to suspect the aim behind this aspect of Wilber’s system 
to be simply that of forestalling the radical restructuring 
of the economy, of the social and political order, and of 
technology, which necessarily will have to be a central 
aspect of the total transformation in question if the latter 
will allow us to survive—not caring the slightest bit for 
the fact that maintaining the status quo with its privilege 
system and its overconsumption would ensure our self-
annihilation. Has not the reader ever wondered why 
Wilber charges so rabidly and furiously against so many 
“green” authors and trends?
Unaware of all that has been written in 
this section, immanentists could conclude that it is 
praiseworthy that Wilber is trying to correct at least one 
of his fundamental errors, by calling for a naturalistic 
turn to religion and introducing the concept of intra-
physical. Though I fully agree with the call in question, 
in terms of my system (certainly not in those of Wilber’s 
rigid, modern, progress-oriented view of our spiritual 
and social evolution) this naturalistic turn would return 
religion to what it was before the otherworldly turning 
that gave birth to the gods (cf. Capriles, 2012), and as such 
it would necessarily imply ceasing to posit a transcendent 
reality—which, as shown above, Wilber has not done, for 
he has continued to assert the existence of such reality, 
by calling for “the transcendent” and the immanent to, 
“in a sense, flavor each other.” (For a substantiation of 
the fact that Buddhism has never posited a transcendent 
reality, and that it outright categorizes those who do as 
extremists, cf. Appendix I in Beyond Mind III [Capriles, 
2009] and Volume III of the upcoming book [Capriles, in 
press].) As to the concept of intra-physical, Frank Visser 
(n.d.) has raised the following questions:
Is intra-physical a physical concept? Then no 
physicist would subscribe to that notion. Or is it 
metaphysical? Then what’s the point of calling all 
this “post-metaphysical”? Isn’t all science supposed to 
be “post-metaphysical”? So what’s the big deal then? 
And if he introduces the notion of “intra-physical”, 
that surely introduces ontology in its wake? For 
Wilber, “post-metaphysical” primarily seems to refer 
to “evidence-based,” compared to speculative. If 
that’s the case, it’s an unfortunate label for a view 
that explores other experiential avenues than the 
bodily senses alone.
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Does the End of Metaphysics 
Amount to the Eradication of Ontology 
or Does it Call for Latter’s Transformation 
into a Metaontology?
The last important feature of Wilber V to be discussed here will be his own characterization of his current 
philosophical position. To begin with, he has claimed 
to have gone beyond metaphysics by no longer asserting 
anything to exist independently. However, as Magnus 
Riisager (n.d.) noted, Wilber still asserts spiritual realities 
to exist independently in the levels he has posited:
Wilber wishes to hold on to the hierarchy (or 
holarchy) of developmental levels (structure-stages). 
As Wilber presents it, we are not just dealing with 
an arrangement of levels according to how including 
they are. Wilber assumes that the things and occasions 
found on the more including levels are more real than 
the things and occasions found on the less including 
levels. This becomes obvious when Wilber talks about 
the spiritual realities found on different levels:
The problem is not that spiritual realities don’t 
exist or are hard to prove; it’s that their earlier 
forms exist on lower levels and hence are not as 
real as some of the later levels, but those higher 
levels have their own spiritual realities” (ibid., p. 
266—my emphasis).
So Wilber apparently operates with a non-
relative measure (of realness) in the Kosmos that is 
not pre-given.
Riisager (n.d.) also noted that:
Wilber appears to believe that Spirit—in one form 
or another—will be found (i.e. will exist) on all 
(not yet evolved) levels; in other words, he doesn’t 
question the presence of Spirit but only the “look” of 
Spirit (cf. Wilber, 2003, note 26). In addition to this, 
Wilber postulates the absolute existence of Eros and 
Agape (Wilber 2006, p. 236, note *).
So Wilber’s unavoidable metaphysics includes:
The hierarchy (holarchy) of structure-stages 
(i.e. a measure of realness),
Spirit,
Eros,
Agape,
A morphogenetic gradient in the manifest realm; 
a morphogenetic field of potentials, and
Certain prototypical (“archetypical”) forms 
or patterns (e.g. mathematical-physical laws) (cf. 
Wilber 2003, note 26).
In order to place the discussion in context 
and then introduce the final bone of contention in 
this assessment of Wilber V, let me briefly review the 
interaction among metaphysical and anti-metaphysical 
trends since René Descartes. The French philosopher 
elaborated his metaphysics in reaction to the objections 
to the purported certainty of knowledge raised by the 
modern skeptics, and in particular by the nouveaux 
pyrrhoniens (New Pyrrhonics; Popkin, 1979), which 
challenged his religious and metaphysical certainties—
possibly to the point of making him experience 
ontological anxiety and even panic—and which could 
undermine the project, so dear to him, of achieving 
technological dominion over the universe through the 
development of science and technology (Capriles, 1994). 
His strategy for trying to make his metaphysics immune 
to skeptic criticism lay in applying the skeptic procedure 
of methodic doubt, not for achieving the skeptic aim 
of realizing it was not even possible to know whether 
or not it was possible to know, but in order to find an 
objective truth that could not be doubted—which he 
wrongly believed to have found in the intuition of what 
he called the cogito, even though the latter is no more 
than an illusion produced by the delusory valuation-
absolutization of the threefold thought structure and 
one of the poles of the structure that is the second aspect 
of avidyā in the division favored by Longchenpa (for a 
full explanation of the three aspects of avidyā in both 
the classification I privileged in the Beyond Mind papers 
and the one Longchenpa and most Dzogchen Masters 
privileged, cf. the Introduction to Vol. I of Capriles [in 
press] and notes 55 and 99 to Capriles [2006], among 
several other works). The French metaphysician then 
unwarrantedly asserted the phenomenon in question 
to be a God-created, nonspatial substance—and, since 
the intuition of the cogito could not found the world’s 
external existence, he had to breach the core principle of 
the method he had assumed, and resort to the Christian 
God to found it.38
Among the resurgences of skepticism after 
Descartes, an important place is to be allotted to Scottish 
moderate skeptic David Hume, who deconstructed 
central categories of Continental metaphysics such as 
substance—one of his essential contributions being the 
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deconstruction of the mind’s purported substantiality—
and causality, among others. Kant claimed that his 
reading of Hume had shaken his convictions, “awakening 
him from his dogmatic dream” and leading him to 
rethink his philosophy on the whole so as to produce a 
totally new system. Though this is partly true, for Kant 
was obliged to rethink much of what he had taken for 
granted, what was mainly shaken by the reading in 
question seems to have been his naïve substantiation of his 
metaphysical convictions (provided these were really his 
convictions39), for he seems to have kept the most essential 
ones among them—such as the belief in the Christian 
God, in a substantial mind and in substance in general, 
in objective beauty and goodness, in the possibility of 
a correct knowledge of most parcels of reality, and so 
forth—which he substantiated by positing a prioris in 
all the compartments into which he divided the psyche, 
and claiming that the existence of these a prioris implied 
the objective, true existence of a substantial mind and of 
substance in general, and of objective truth, beauty and 
moral law. Thus what Kant’s reading of Hume actually 
did was to force him to express his dogmatic metaphysics 
in a new way, so as to give the false impression that he was 
respecting the limits of knowledge and producing a non-
dogmatic system (for an explanation of how he breached 
the limits in question, cf. Capriles, 1994, 2007a Vol. I).
The widespread realization of Kant’s failure in his 
purported attempt to produce a metaphysics that would 
respect the limits inherent in knowledge, thus avoiding 
dogmatism, is at the root of the characteristically modern 
project of positivism, the best-known forms of which 
intended to surpass metaphysics (and even ontology and 
all that has traditionally gone under the label philosophy), 
by keeping to supposedly verifiable evidence of the kind 
the positive sciences deem admissible. In fact, among 
the different forms of positivism, August Compte’s 
claimed that ontology and the rest of what traditionally 
went under the label philosophy had to be replaced by 
an encyclopædia of the positive sciences; much later, at 
the turn of the twentieth century, the Austrian empirio-
criticists produced a science-based critical philosophy that, 
like the philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead (which 
was intended to surpass, by the same token, the whole of 
the classic dualisms of metaphysics, and substantialistic 
monism), involved an ontology free from the mind-matter 
dualism; time after that, the neopositivists, including 
those in the Vienna Circle, circumscribed philosophy 
to a critical philosophy of science, thus turning it into 
a servant and handmaiden of science; some trends of 
philosophy of language (not Ludwig Wittgenstein’s final 
system, as it asserted language not to match reality and 
to be a source of delusion40) circumscribed the ambit of 
philosophy to determining whether or not statements are 
meaningful, and so forth.
Since, unfortunately, most trends within 
positivism kept the belief in science as the bearer of 
truth—a trend that reached a paroxysm when philosophy 
was reduced to a servant of the sciences—in the current 
era all forms of positivism are widely seen as obsolete 
remnants of the enthusiasm with science proper to early 
modernity. In particular, even though most of those 
philosophers who define themselves as postmodern 
continue to implicitly uphold the myth of progress that is 
the root and essence of modernity, as a rule they outright 
negate that science and philosophy discover truths or that 
the discourses they produce can achieve an adæquatio rei 
et intellectus (i.e., a concordance of human knowledge 
with a purportedly independent, factic reality). In 
fact, this idea runs counter, not only to those trends of 
philosophy that categorize themselves as postmodern, 
but in general to the views of a long list of philosophers, 
scientists, and philosopher-scientists, and that goes at 
least as back as the Greek Skeptics. (A quite interesting 
case is that of Wilfred Sellars [1997, 1963], who absorbed 
and amalgamated elements of British and American 
analytic philosophy and Austrian and German logical 
positivism, as well as of American Pragmatism—and, in 
at least one work [1968], even of Kant’s transcendental 
idealism—and became renowned for having questioned 
the foundationalist belief in a given that may serve as the 
basis for an adæquatio intellectus et rei.)
It was noted that Kant claimed that the Scottish 
critical empiricist, David Hume, had awakened him 
from what he called his “dogmatic dream.” Among 
Hume’s alleged discoveries, most relevant at this point 
is the universally accepted objection to empirical science 
as the source of “scientific laws,” which nowadays is 
widely referred to as Hume’s law, and which may be 
enunciated as follows: “one is not entitled to extrapolate 
the regularities observed in a limited number of cases to 
the totality of possible cases, thus making it into a law, 
as one or more of the unobserved cases could contradict 
the observed regularity.” Moreover, science claims that it 
derives its purported laws from observation of objective 
facts, the very existence of which, as noted above, 
Sellars called into question. For their part, the scientists’ 
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observations are, as Bachelard made it clear (1957) and 
as so many others have reiterated,41 utterly conditioned 
by their expectations—and therefore by their ideologies 
and wishful thinking. An anecdote told by Edgar Morin 
(1981) clearly illustrates the extent to which observational 
judgments are conditioned by ideology: while driving his 
car into a crossroads, he saw another car’s driver disregard 
the traffic light and, with his car’s front bumper, hit a 
moped that was moving with the green light. Morin 
stopped his car and stepped down in order to testify in 
favor of the moped driver, yet when he did so he heard 
the latter admit that it was him who overlooked the red 
light and hit the car on the side. Incredulous, the famed 
thinker examined the car, finding the dent the moped 
made in the car to be on the latter’s side, and concluding 
that his thirst for social justice and socialist ideology 
caused him to perceive the event wrongly and invert the 
facts, even though he had not drunk any alcohol and no 
other conditions were present that could have distorted 
his perception. In the case of an experiment planned 
beforehand, the results are far more doubtful, for the 
way in which the experiment is set up and the criteria in 
terms of which the data it yields are assessed are arranged 
to satisfy the researcher’s expectations, as he / she intends 
to corroborate a theory put forward beforehand.
The above explains why such a conservative 
thinker as Karl Popper (1961) noted that, if no experience 
contradicts a theory, scientists are entitled to adopt it 
provisionally as a probable truth (thus open-mindedly 
acknowledging that no scientific theory can be fully 
substantiated, yet closed-mindedly clinging to the belief 
in truth qua adæquatio), and that the acceptance of a 
new theory gives rise to as many problems as it solves. 
Moreover, as it is well-known, on going through the 
history of science, Thomas Kuhn (1970) noted that from 
the moment a scientific theory or paradigm is accepted 
as true, scientific observations begin to contradict it, yet 
the scientists consistently overlook these contradictions 
until the point is reached at which contradictions become 
so abundant and conspicuous that they can no longer 
ignore them, and hence they must set out to devise new 
theories and paradigms in order to account for these 
observations—yet new observations will contradict the 
new theory or paradigm as well, and hence the process in 
question will repeat itself again and again. In fact, in the 
current era the belief that science discovers truths has been 
demystified to such a degree, that Paul K. Feyerabend 
(1982, 1984, 1987)—who has shown scientists to often 
arrive at their discoveries and theories by breaking the 
established procedural rules of science—placed Western 
reason and science on the same plane as magic and sorcery.
In the Genealogy of Morals, Friedrich Nietzsche 
(1999) had already left behind the above-discussed idea 
that human interpretations often do not reflect facts, and 
had gone so far as to claim that there are no facts that 
may be or not be matched by those interpretations. In his 
allegedly “postmodern” period, in which he propounded 
the active radicalization of nihilism, Gianni Vattimo 
(1995, p. 50) wrote in this regard:
Nihilism means in Nietzsche “de-valorization of the 
supreme values” and fabulation of the world: there 
are no facts, only interpretations, and this is also an 
interpretation.
All of the above shows that Georges Sorel 
(1922, 1906, 1908) was right in claiming, between the 
last years of the nineteenth century and the onset of the 
twentieth century, that human beings act under the 
influence of myths, that the sciences are myths, and that 
the scientific pretensions of Marxism—a focus of his 
criticism—responded to the force of the myth of science, 
which prevailed in Marx’s time.42 It also suggests that 
Antonio Gramsci (1998, p. 63)43 was equally right in 
pointing out, in 1948, that to the extent to which one 
takes the “discoveries” of the sciences as truths in the 
sense of adæquatio of a scientific map to an interpreted 
territory, the sciences are ideologies. The point is 
that science and technology are indivisible from the 
ideological project of modernity,44 which initially was 
associated with the ascending bourgeoisie and at a later 
stage, through the influence of Marxism, also with the 
ascending proletariat: as Marcuse (1964) noted, science 
is by its very nature instrumental, and hence it naturally 
delivers the means for the domination of the natural 
environment and other human beings (“From Negative 
to Positive Thinking: Technological Rationality and 
the Logic of Domination,” ch. 6 of Marcuse, 1964).45 
Thus it is not difficult to see why Michel Foucault (1976, 
1978) and Gilles Deleuze (1980)46 asserted philosophy 
and science to be more than ideologies: for a very long 
time philosophical systems, and for a shorter time 
scientific disciplines and theories (according to Deleuze, 
psychoanalysis played this role at the time he wrote 
the book in question), have functioned as an “abstract 
machine or generalized axiomatic” that works as the 
matrix that makes possible the very existence of power—
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their function being that of providing power with the 
forms of knowledge necessary to sustain the models on 
the basis of which it will have to structure itself in each 
period.
As to the logic in terms of which the sciences 
function, it is evident that from one standpoint a given 
entity is that entity, yet from a different viewpoint 
(belonging to a different logical type) it is not that 
entity (e.g., from a certain standpoint a wooden table is 
a table, but from other standpoints it is not a table but: 
an assembly of pieces of wood; a conglomerate of atoms; 
a piece, singled out for perception, of the continuum 
that according to Einstein’s Field Theory the universe is; 
etc.)—and that this may at first sight seem to contradict 
Aristotelian logic (in particular, the conjunction of the 
principle of the excluded middle and the principle of 
noncontradiction that Peter Suber [1997] referred to as 
Exclusive Disjunction for Contradictories [PEDC]). In 
their noted Theory of Logical Types, Bertrand Russell 
and A. N. Whitehead (1910-1913) seemingly intended 
to solve apparent problems of this kind by asserting 
contradictions between terms to be “real” only when both 
terms belong to the same logical type, and hence requiring 
that no element belonging to a logical type different 
from that of the class being dealt with be included in the 
class or excluded from it. However, the theory elaborated 
by Russell and Whitehead was objected by Kurt Gödel 
(1962), who pinpointed a major problem, not only of the 
theory in question, but of all deductive systems—which, 
after induction was shown to be nonexistent, has been 
acknowledged to include all scientific systems—by 
ideating his incompleteness theorem, which showed 
all logical systems to necessarily contain at least one 
premise that cannot be proven or verified without the 
system contradicting itself … from which it follows that 
it is impossible to establish the logical consistency of any 
complex deductive system without assuming principles 
of reasoning the internal consistency of which is as open 
to questioning as the system itself. With a reasoning far 
more accessible to the general reader, Gregory Bateson 
(1972) noted that in order not to include or exclude items 
that do not belong to the logical type being considered, 
as the theory of logical types demanded, one had to 
exclude all such items from consideration, which meant 
that one was excluding them in order not to exclude 
them and thus was violating the principle one was 
intent on respecting. Moreover, this implies that, when 
dealing with the class to which x belongs, whatever does 
not belong to the same class as x cannot be considered 
either as x or as non-x—which violates the principle of 
Aristotelian logic the theory in question was intended 
to save, for according to it whatever is not x is non-x. 
Of course, if one regards the theory of logical types 
as a mere convention necessary for resolving practical 
problems, rather than as an attempt to substantiate the 
supposedly ultimate character of Aristotelian logic, then 
it will fulfill its purpose—and, at any rate, the problems 
just discussed may be deemed irrelevant for the validity 
or invalidity of the empirical sciences.
I would not deny that, in spite of Hume’s law 
and the whole of the above objections, the sciences are 
as a rule capable of predicting some types of events with a 
considerable degree of reliability, as well as of producing 
predictable immediate effects. However, in the long 
run they produce effects that altogether contradict the 
ones they claim to be intent on producing. In fact, as 
I have noted elsewhere (Capriles, in press, 2007a, etc.), 
in terms of Korzybski’s (1973) semantics, according to 
which sanity is determined by the structural fit between 
one’s reactions to the world and what is actually going 
on in the world, and insanity by the lack of such fit, 
it is necessary to conclude that Śākyamuni Buddha was 
certainly right when he compared fully fledged avidyā 
to an illness, and that Candrakīrti hit the mark when 
he compared this fully fledged avidyā to insanity,47 for 
it gives rise to a severe structural discrepancy between 
human reactions to the world and what is actually going 
on in the world: as stated again and again throughout 
my works, human attempts to achieve satisfaction 
yield dissatisfaction, efforts to suppress pain produce 
pain, and efforts to (allegedly) destroy death and all 
negative aspects of life and build a technological Eden 
have originated the ecological crisis that is producing 
major natural disasters and which threatens to disrupt 
human society and even put an end to human existence 
in the course of the present century. Thus it seems that 
Korzybski was wrong when noting, in terms of the famed 
map-territory analogy, that although the map is not the 
territory, the map could be correct in the sense of having 
a structure similar to that of the territory that allows one 
to successfully deal with the latter—thus achieving the 
structural fit defining sanity.
Korzybski’s criterion coincides with the one that, 
in the face of Hume’s law and the accumulated objections 
of subsequent epistemologists (cf. Capriles, 1994, 2007a 
vol. III, 2007b), Alfred Julius Ayer (1981) devised with the 
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aim of validating the sciences: the one according to which 
“we are authorized to have faith in our procedure, so long 
as it carries out its function, which is that of predicting 
future experience and thus control our environment.” 
However, in trying to control the environment with the 
purported aim of creating an artificial Eden and kill 
death and pain, the sciences and the technology based 
on them, rather than achieving their declared effect,48 
have produced a hellish chaos and taken humanity to 
the brink of extinction—and, moreover, at no moment 
did they foresee this outcome. Therefore Ayer’s criterion, 
rather than validating, outright invalidates the sciences.
In fact, as already noted, the current ecological 
crisis has made it evident that the technological 
application of the sciences in the long run gives rise to 
effects contrary to the ones they are allegedly intended to 
produce. Thus to the extent to which the sciences involve 
a pretension of truth in the sense of exact correspondence 
of their maps to the territory of the given, or the pretension 
of improving human lives and producing a technological 
paradise, it is clear that they are metanarratives involving 
the denial of their character as metanarratives, and as 
such they must be denounced as being both myths and 
ideologies: they are elements of modernity’s myth of 
progress,49 which ecological crisis has proved, not merely 
to be unrealizable, but to be outright deadly.50
The above discussion of the limits of science 
makes it evident that the positivistic belief that 
metaphysics will be surpassed and truth will be attained 
by replacing philosophy with the positive sciences (etc.) 
could hardly be more misguided. However, in the first 
half of the twentieth century the initial attempts were 
made to surpass metaphysics in a way radically different 
from those proper to ordinary positivism—among which 
at this point it is relevant to briefly refer to those made 
by Edmund Husserl, who devised phenomenology in the 
twentieth century sense of the term, and later on some 
of the Continental philosophers that further developed 
the discipline in question. Rather than trying to surpass 
metaphysics by rejecting ontology, as ordinary positivism 
had done, Husserl developed that which he referred to as 
an absolute positivism, which rather than dealing with the 
so-called “positive knowledge” produced by the sciences, 
was concerned with essences relevant to ontology—his 
intent being that of producing an ontology purportedly 
based solely on what appears (universally accepted sense 
of the Greek term phainomenon) in human experience, 
which, he believed, as such would be free from unfounded 
metaphysical theses. In this he was followed by the rest 
of twentieth century phenomenologists, whose discipline 
enjoyed the highest prestige for decades. However, 
nowadays it is widely acknowledged that the discipline 
in question fell short of its purported aim.
One of the noted philosophers whose 
denunciation of this fact made the greatest impact was 
Jacques Derrida (1967), who asserted phenomenology to 
be no more than a [crypto]-metaphysics, while referring 
to the phenomenological emphasis on the supposed 
immediacy of experience as the “new transcendental 
illusion.” I endorse Derrida’s assertion, except for one 
detail, which I discuss in the note appended at the 
end of this sentence.51 However, the reason why for me 
phenomenology is a cryptometaphysics, and the belief 
in the immediacy of experience an illusion springing 
from an error analogous to the one that, according 
to Kant, gave rise to the “transcendental illusion,” is 
particular to my own perspective. The problem, for 
me, is that basing ontology exclusively on that which 
appears (phainomenon) in experience is no guarantee 
that metaphysical constructs will not slip into it, for in 
samsāra, to which human experience pertains, fully-
fledged avidyā causes one to experience being as given, 
unquestionable, ineradicable, and somehow absolute; to 
experience the mental subject as being in its own right and 
hence as a substance, and as being the thinker of thought, 
the doer of action and the experiencer of experience; to 
experience the essents one faces as being substantial in 
Heidegger’s (1996) sense of making resistance to us and 
so on, as being in their own right and thus as self-existent, 
and as being in their own right this or that entity, and 
so forth. Hence an ontology elaborated on the basis 
of samsaric experience alone would not be really free 
from metaphysical fictions, as it will most likely feature 
at least some of the ones just mentioned (i.e., given, 
inherent, somehow absolute being; a substantial cogito 
inherently separate from the physical world and even 
from the human individual’s experiences, thoughts and 
acts, which thinks thoughts, carries out acts and receives 
experiences; countless external, physical, substantial and 
self-existent essents) and probably many other ones.
The above is what, as a rule, occurred with 
twentieth century phenomenology. The most outstanding, 
core phenomena of fully-fledged avidyā (or Heraclitean 
lethe) that Edmund Husserl wrongly viewed as given, 
ineradicable, self-existent substances, inadvertently 
turning them into unfounded metaphysical foundations 
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of his system, were the purportedly absolute Cartesian 
cogito and the purportedly substantial noetic-noematic 
(mental subject / object in human experience) schism that 
is the condition of possibility of the cogito and the axis of 
all dualistic, allegedly immediate yet actually mediated 
samsaric experience. Martin Heidegger found Husserl’s 
departure from metaphysics insufficient and set out to 
carry it as far as he deemed it necessary, whereas Jean-
Paul Sartre and others of those who received Heidegger’s 
influence set out to go beyond Heidegger—yet both 
Heidegger and Sartre, like the bulk of phenomenologists 
of the last century, failed to go beyond metaphysics, 
for both of them failed to realize that samsaric human 
beings are completely deluded, and that the phenomenon 
of being that pervades human experience is no more than 
a deceptive appearance manifesting in experience that 
constitutes a pivotal aspect of human delusion, and thus 
continued to take being to be given, somehow absolute, 
unquestionable and ineradicable.
Heidegger, in particular—as I have shown 
in depth elsewhere (Capriles, 2007a Vol. I)—wholly 
misunderstood Heraclitus’ concepts of lethe and aletheia, 
reducing the dialectics between the respective conditions 
to such a shallow level as to make it insignificant 
(Capriles, 2007a Vol. I52). In the same way, under the spell 
of delusion, he overlooked the fact that the true nature 
of reality, since it cannot be included in a class wider 
than itself and does not exclude anything, has neither 
proximate genus nor specific difference (genus proximum 
/ differentia specifica), and hence cannot be contained 
in any concept, including those of being (which, as he 
himself acknowledged in the Introduction to Being and 
Time [Heidegger, 1996] by citing Pascal, has its specific 
difference in the concept of nonbeing), nonbeing (which 
has its specific difference in the concept of being), 
both and neither (the latter two, beside being positions 
excluded by logic, being mutually exclusive). Although 
he rightly identified being with the phenomenon of being 
pervading the whole of the experience that twentieth 
century phenomenologists deemed immediate but that 
is actually mediated, he failed to realize the phenomenon 
in question to be one of the most basic erroneous 
appearances of the basic human delusion, and taking it 
to be given and true, he went as far as to make the logical 
mistake of identifying it with the arche or true nature of 
reality.53
For his part, Sartre (1980) seemed to have 
mistakenly, metaphysically assumed that there was 
a given, absolute being distinct from the phenomenon 
of being,54 and (like Husserl) that the subject-object 
duality that manifests in human experience—as well 
as the duality of their respective modes of being—
was ineradicable. However, in spite of this, and of 
Derrida’s charges that in his interpretation and usage of 
Heidegger’s concepts he incurred in a psychologism as 
well as in an anthropocentrism, the French existentialist 
had invaluable insights that can greatly contribute to the 
philosophy these times require. Among other things, he 
clearly showed the cogito not to be a substance (as I 
have shown elsewhere,55 by the same token providing 
the tools for elucidating Dignāga’s important concept 
of svasamvitti / svasamvedana / rangrig (rang rig) / 
awareness [of] consciousness, and determining how 
does it relate to the Dzogchen usage of rangrig / 
svasamvedana); he asserted human existence to be 
drawn toward the holon—a term that he used in a sense 
radically different from Koestler’s (1967; Koestler & 
Smythies, 1970), and that he explained in a way that 
allows one to identify it with Awakening—as telos,56 
asserting all human actions and so on to be carried out 
in the hope of achieving the qualities of the condition 
in question (which, however, he deemed it impossible to 
attain);57 and he deconstructed the pseudo-unity of the 
Dasein, revealing its constitutive elements and the way 
they interact, in a way that may be most profitable to 
Buddhist practitioners, and in particular to those who 
practice Dzogchen. (For an in-depth discussion of all of 
this cf. Capriles, 2007a Vol. I.)
The above exposed the pretense of twentieth 
century phenomenology of having gone beyond 
metaphysics for what it was. Wilber V carried his 
pretences much farther than the phenomenology in 
question, for beside pretending to have gone beyond 
metaphysics—which as Riisager (n.d.) showed, he 
simply has not—he pretends to have gone beyond 
ontology—on which he, just like some of those who have 
discussed him so far, seemingly under the spell of so-
called postmodern thought, decidedly frowns. In fact, 
after phenomenology’s abortive attempts to produce a 
nonmetaphysical ontology, Jacques Derrida, claiming 
to have found the sketching of an end of ontology in 
Nietzsche, Lacan’s Freud and Levinas, undertook what he 
deemed to be a destruction of metaphysics which, unlike 
the one Heidegger pretended to have achieved, would be 
genuine and thorough, and which would bring ontology 
to an end and by the same token open a perspective in 
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which that which he called différance58 would find a place. 
He believed the way to achieve this to consist in doing 
away with ontological elaborations and circumscribing 
the task of philosophy to the deconstruction (the French 
déconstruction translates Heiddeger’s use of Destruktion 
and Abbau—in non-Derrida contexts, often rendered 
in English as debuilding) of existing discourses—and 
in particular of all totalizing metanarratives, which 
had been a target of so-called postmodern thought ever 
since Lyotard (1979) introduced this defective label. 
However, in the first place, in Derrida’s writings one 
finds significant ontological assertions, so that they may 
be seen as outlining an ontology.59 Moreover, at any 
rate, simply to do away with ontology would be of no 
use, for as noted above, fully-fledged avidyā gives rise 
to an experiential ontological confusion that consists 
in perceiving all phenomena-that-are-in-the-process-of-
being—that is, all essents (German, Seiende; French, 
étants; etc.)—as being inherently, absolutely and in-their-
own-right (i.e., without depending on anything else) the 
essents one perceives them as being, and in experiencing the 
being of essents as a given, somehow absolute reality—all 
of which has terrible consequences, for not only is it at the 
root of the duhkha that constitutes the First Noble Truth, 
but its exacerbation, together with the intensification 
of the figure-ground split that hampers appreciation 
of interdependences, is the very root of ecological 
destruction. Although this experiential ontological 
confusion cannot be eradicated by intellectual means 
alone, in the case of formally educated people, or of 
people having an intellectual disposition, the capacity to 
decidedly, unwaveringly undertake the practices necessary 
for eradicating the confusion in question will depend on 
understanding it beforehand to be a confusion rather 
than the undistorted experience of the true condition of 
reality, as it is ordinarily taken to be—for only thus can 
some conviction be obtained that there can be a Path of 
Liberation, at least to the point to which this is feasible 
by merely intellectual means. This is the reason why 
ontological investigation has been a key element in all 
authentic forms of Buddhism, Taoism, Śaivism, Sūfīsm, 
the original Kabbalah, and the other systems I deem 
conducive to Awakening, and ineluctably must continue 
to be so. (Contrariwise, evolutionary psychology has no 
role on the Path—this being one of the many reasons 
why I find Wilber’s writings so heavy: because he devotes 
so much of his reflection to questions that are even more 
distractive and irrelevant to Awakening than the fourteen 
unconjecturable [avyākr.ta] questions [avyākr.tavastūni] 
before which Śākyamuni Buddha remained silent60 
[which will be briefly discussed in the upcoming book 
rearranging the materials of the Beyond Mind papers 
(Capriles, in press, Vol. III, Appendix I and its notes)].)
The above is one of the main reasons why in 
various of my works (most thoroughly in Capriles, 
2007a Vol. III, 2012, in press) I have asserted totalizing 
metanarratives to be vital, though preliminary, aspects 
of the spiritual therapy required for healing the human 
mind, society and the ecosystem. However, in order to 
play this role, they must be structured in such a way as 
to fulfill the dual purpose of showing the baselessness 
of the assumptions of common sense—including the 
assumption that conceptual systems can precisely match 
reality—and helping one develop the faith necessary 
to, (1) set out to apply the practices that lead beyond 
understanding in terms of thought, into the immediate, 
direct, nonconceptual realization of the true condition 
of ourselves and the whole of reality, and (2) set out to 
work toward the technological, economic, political, 
social, cultural—in one word, total—transformation 
that would help heal the ecological crisis humans have 
produced (which as noted repeatedly has put at stake the 
very continuity of human society and even of human 
existence) and achieve what Tibetan Lama Chögyam 
Trungpa (1984) called “an enlightened society.” This 
is why the value of metanarratives exhorting abolition 
of the delusory valuation of words and concepts, and 
showing how can this be achieved, depends on their 
explicit acknowledgement that they are Aśvaghosian uses 
of language arisen spontaneously from a perspective that 
does not confuse the maps of words and concepts with the 
territory—as such being comparable to fingers pointing 
to the moon that one must not confuse with the satellite, 
or to rafts for crossing to the other shore (that of nirvān. a) 
to be left behind as one reaches it. Furthermore, in order 
to fulfill their aim, they must make it clear that the task 
they indicate cannot be fulfilled by playing word games 
or by merely achieving an intellectual understanding 
of reality, for it requires one to wholeheartedly devote 
oneself to a spiritual practice of the kind discussed 
in my works—which cannot be learned in books or 
Internet courses, for it will work only if one receives its 
transmission from a good, authentic Teacher holding a 
true, genuine, uninterrupted lineage originating in the 
source of the teachings, and set out to apply his or her 
instructions for going beyond the intellect.
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Back to Derrida, a major drawback of his philosophy 
is that, as David Loy (1987) noted, it deconstructs identity 
and the pairs of opposites, yet fails to deconstruct that which 
he called différance and which is for him the condition of 
possibility of all differences—whereas Nāgārjuna, creator 
of Mādhyamaka philosophy, as early as the beginning 
of the Christian era, by the same token deconstructed 
the basis of identity and difference, thus leaving no 
ontological assumption or basis for ontological assumption 
unchallenged. In fact, as shown elsewhere (Capriles, 2007a 
Vol. I), the highest systems of Buddhist philosophy—which 
are Mahāmādhyamaka and the Mahāyāna and Vajrayāna 
Mādhyamaka Prāsangika—and the Dzogchen teachings 
are totally free from such metaphysical assumptions 
and thus need not undergo either deconstruction or 
reconstruction. As I see it, these systems are by the same 
token antecedents and keys to the production of an ontology 
free from the belief in the givenness of being and in all of the 
metaphysical assumptions of phenomenology that would 
perfectly respond to the needs of the current time. The latter 
is that which I set out to elaborate in some of my works 
(the most elaborate being Capriles, 2007a Vol. I) and which 
I call metaphenomenology—which can only be achieved by 
means of a method of inquiry that, rather than basing its 
hermeneutics of experience exclusively on the phenomena 
of samsāra, considers and privileges the metaphenomenon/a 
of nirvān. a61 that shows all of the phenomena of sam.  sāra 
and derived, reified metaphysical assumptions to be baseless 
illusions.
The metaphenomenology in question is also a 
metaontology: an ontology that discerns the nature of 
being and of the entities which are in the process of being 
(essents), as well as of nonbeing and so on. Whereas Western 
ontology so far has been based solely on the experience 
founded on the phenomenon of being that is proper to 
samsāra, what I refer to as metaontology is so called because 
it is principally based on the nirvanic unconcealment of 
the true condition of both oneself and the rest of reality, 
in which the phenomenon of being has dissolved and thus 
it has become evident that it was no more than a baseless 
appearance pervading all experience conditioned by the 
basic human delusion that, as the Mahāyāna version of 
the Four Noble Truth makes it clear, constitutes the root 
of suffering—and which, as I have explained in many 
works (Capriles, 1986, 1994, 2007a Vol. III and minor 
works), is the root of ecological crisis as well. Therefore, 
rather than taking being to be given or to constitute the 
true nature of reality, it denounces it—together with the 
rest of the phenomena at the root of the assumptions 
of metaphysics—as one of the most basic deceptive 
appearances that issue from fully-fledged avidyā.
Moreover, the root and essence of modernity 
is the myth of evolutionary progress, which, together 
with many of the metaphysical illusions and mistaken 
assumptions proper to mainstream Western philosophy, 
continues to underlie a great deal of so-called 
postmodern thought—including most works that have 
attempted so-called “postmodern” reconstructions of 
the deconstructed (many of which have done so on the 
basis of a Heidegger-inspired hermeneutics). This is also 
the case with Wilber V, who claimed to have produced 
a post-metaphysical reconstruction of primordial 
traditions that in his view can salvage the latter’s essence 
while shedding their ontological baggage, yet continues 
to be under the spell of the modern myth of progress and 
of so many of his former metaphysical assumptions—
including otherwordly ones!
Furthermore, the task Wilber undertook 
could hardly be more pointless and futile, for as shown 
above, millennia ago both the higher forms of Buddhist 
philosophy and the Dzogchen teachings deconstructed 
whatever needed to be deconstructed—unlike Derrida, 
including not only identity and difference, but the 
condition of possibility of difference as well. If there 
remained anything to do in our time, it would be to 
express the viewless view of the systems of Buddhist 
philosophy and the Buddhist Path in question in an 
up-to-date, re-elaborated way, as a result of confronting 
them with the concepts and views of Western philosophy 
from its onset until our time—which is precisely what I 
have attempted in so many of my works (for a thorough 
exposition of what I call my metaphenomenological, 
metaexistential metaontology, cf. Capriles [2007a Vol. I]; 
for an in-depth discussion of the blemishes of so-called 
postmodern philosophy and a thorough explanation of 
what I view as genuinely post-modern, cf. Vol. III of the 
same work [Capriles, 2007a Vol. III] and my most recent 
book in Spanish [Capriles, 2012]).
As to overly metaphysical spiritual traditions—
including Perennialism, which in contrast with the 
above-refuted, wrong use of the term postmodern by a 
rich philosophical fauna, Wilber now apparently views as 
premodern—Visser (2003) deems it extremely doubtful 
that the essence of the traditions in question will come 
across in Wilber V’s version, which the author claims to 
have freed of untenable teachings and categorizes as post-
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metaphysical. With regard to the same traditions, Visser 
(2003) said as well that Wilber’s latest writings obliterate 
the difference between (exoteric) standard mythical 
religious beliefs, and their (esoteric) mystical or so-called 
occult reformulations, making the point that the reasons 
why modernity rejects most of the premodern heritage 
must be carefully weighted—even though he views the 
attempt to reframe perennialism into a form that is not 
offensive to either modernity or postmodernity as an 
interesting exercise.
Even though the fact that Wilber carried 
out this radical reshaping of his system amounts to 
acknowledging that he was altogether wrong in so much 
of what he formerly asserted, in one of the Integral Life 
Newsletters of the last months of 2010 he wrote that in 
spite of it he has always been right! Since among the views 
that have remained unchanged through the successive 
Wilbers, some of the central ones are his view of our 
phylogenetic spiritual and social evolution as betterment 
and progress, and his view of our ontogenic development 
as occurring along different lines in a rigid structural 
schema where advancement along the various lines is 
to a considerable extent interdependent—and, for the 
last two decades, also his association of the four highest 
levels to the four kāyas of higher Buddhist systems—it is 
to be assumed that it is these views (which were shown 
throughout the Beyond Mind papers, the upcoming 
book systematizing their contents, and this reply, to be 
altogether wrong) that have always been right. (A Buddha 
is right even when he makes what scientists would see as 
conventionally incorrect assertions, for He is free from 
delusion and hence is error-free, and He makes those 
assertions without believing them to be conventionally 
true; however, Wilber is not a Buddha.)
Conclusion
As given to understand above, a thorough assessment of Wilber V would require an altogether new work, 
as its intent is so ambitious—yet it would be currently 
impossible to produce it because the new system by Wilber 
is in the process of being built (one of the few works 
publicly published in what is presumably its definitive 
form being Integral Spirituality [Wilber, 2007]). At the 
time of writing this, the reader interested in exploring 
Wilber V may consult Wilber (2001a, 2001b, 2002a, 
2002b, 2002c, 2003a, 2003b, 2007, 2010), Wilber and 
Cohen (2002, 2005), all the works cited in this section 
and many of those posted in Visser’s Site, Integral World, 
and Reynolds’ (n.d.) eulogy of Wilber.
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Notes
 
1.     The difficulty in buying foreign books in Venezu-
ela stems from draconian foreign currency restric-
tions implemented by the Chavez government (each 
Venezuelan citizen who applies for it, is allotted a 
very small sum of foreign currency every year for 
use with credit cards in Internet shopping) and the 
fact that it is hard for University professors to buy 
foreign books with black market foreign currency, 
for the latter is extremely expensive, and since the 
government has not adjusted salaries proportionally 
to inflation, income has dwindled considerably in 
real terms—and, at any rate, I am not aware of any 
way to do Internet shopping with cash. As noted in 
the regular text, even in the absence of this difficul-
ty, I would not procure and read all Wilber works as 
he publishes them, as his views are only relevant to 
my writings on transpersonal theory and practice, 
which is only one subject among the many I address 
in my books. 
I strongly doubt I will produce critiques of any 
further turns in Wilber’s system, but if I did, it must 
be taken for granted that I would not do so immedi-
ately after these new turns take place.
2.   Visser (2003) is the author of Ken Wilber: Thought 
as Passion. His Website’s Internet address is http://
www.integralworld.net
3.    The name is the same as that of the author of Over-
do$ed America, but I assume this to be no more 
than a coincidence.
4.   This refers to Wilber’s former claim that the world 
came out from a supramundane source yet contin-
ues to be one with the latter.
5.   If the term “form” (Skt. rūpa) were circumscribed 
to the forms perceived through the five universally 
acknowledged senses—thus including the so-called 
material forms of tsel (rtsal) energy and the lumi-
nous, yet intangible forms of rölpa (rol pa) energy* 
but not so phenomena of dang energy such as the 
mental images involved in fantasy, imagination, vi-
sualization and so on, then it would no doubt be 
necessary to exclude the latter. However, here I am 
using the word form in the sense it has in common 
English, which includes all sorts of configurations 
and patterns—no matter whether or not they are 
perceivable through the five universally acknowl-
edged senses.
*In general the Dzogchen teachings do not assert 
phenomena of rölpa energy to be perceived through 
the eyes; however, here I must address the views of 
contemporary science, according to which those vi-
sions, just like hallucinations (induced by whichever 
means), are perceived through vibrations of the rods 
and cones that are not “induced” by the impact of 
light coming from outside the body.
6.  The Pramān. avāda tradition of Dignāga and Dhar-
makīrti—assimilated by the Indian Svātantrika 
Masters and, in Tibet, by nearly all Mādhyami-
kas—distinguishes between two types of negation: 
(1) nonaffirming, nonimplicative or absolute nega-
tion (Skt. prasājyapratiseda; Tib. megag [med dgag]), 
and (2) affirming, implicative or relative negation 
(Skt. paryudāsapratrisedha; Tib. mayindag [ma yin 
dgag]).
The negation that is categorized as nonaffirm-
ing, nonimplicative or absolute is said to be the one 
that negates the object of negation without implying 
anything else: it is defined as “a negative which is 
such that the term expressing it does not suggest in 
place of the negation of its own object of negation 
another, positive phenomenon which is its own ob-
ject of negation” (Hopkins, 1983, p. 723). This type 
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of negation is often illustrated by statements such as 
there are no flowers in the sky or there are no real 
falling hairs (the second one applying to a person that 
suffers from myodesopsia and confuses muscæ voli-
tantis or floaters with falling hairs)—which, however, 
are uncertain examples, for the first statement implies 
the existence of the sky, the second implies that of 
a perceiver and the world in general (for there can 
be no experience of falling hairs without a perceiver, 
hairs—even if these are not “actually falling”—and 
the rest of relative phenomena of the world), and as a 
rule the statements used to illustrate this kind of ne-
gation always imply the existence of something else.
On the other hand, affirming, implicative or rel-
ative negation is said to imply something else: it is 
defined as “any negation of an object, quality, etc. 
that implies the assertion of some other facts.” Com-
mon examples of this type of negation are statements 
such as, “for the last thirty years the fat man Deva-
datta has not eaten during daytime,” which implies 
that he has been eating during the night (as other-
wise he would not be fat, and, moreover, unless he 
were a Rasāyana yogi [Tib. chülen naljorpa (bcud len 
rnal ’byor pa)], he would have died within months), 
or “this man is not a Brahmin (Brāhman. a),” which 
implies that he is empty of Brahminhood but not so 
of manhood, and that he either belongs to anoth-
er of the Hindu castes, or has no caste whatsoever 
and thus is either a non-Indian, an Indian dalit or 
“oppressed” (i.e., one of those that Brahmanism calls 
“untouchable” and that Gandhi referred to by the 
Rgveda-contradicting euphemism, harijan or “child 
of god”), or an Indian ādivāsi (“primal inhabitant”: 
an aboriginal with a tribal way of life).
Je Tsongkhapa viewed the apprehension 
of what he deemed to be the ultimate truth as 
it manifests in the Contemplation state of the 
superior bodhisattva, as involving a nonimplicative, 
nonaffirming or absolute negation—which, since 
negation is conceptual and can be entertained in 
secondary process only, or, in the terminology of 
Dignāga and Dharmakīrti’s Pramān. avāda tradition, 
as well as in that of the Dzogchen teachings, it is 
a universal, abstract concept of an entity [resulting 
from a mental synthesis] (Skt. arthasāmānya; Tib. 
dönchi [don spyi]), amounted to positing as the 
ultimate a conceptual experience (which by being 
stabilized through pacifying meditation, so that no 
coarse, discursive thoughts [i.e., what Dignāga and 
the Dzogchen teachings call word sound patterns 
resulting from mental syntheses that are audio 
categories (Skt. śabdasāmānya; Tib. drachi: sgra 
spyi)] arise, is made to pass for a nonconceptual 
realization)—and asserted this type of negation to 
be a distinguishing feature of Prāsangika. However, 
Jamgön Mipham correctly asserted the reduction of 
the ultimate truth to a negation of this kind to be a 
special emphasis of the Svātantrika system (which, 
moreover, and as stressed repeatedly, in this system 
is asserted to give rise to the provisional, conceptual 
ultimate that it refers to as categorized ultimate 
[Skt. paryāyaparamārtha; Tib. namdrangpai döndam 
(rnam grangs pa’ i don dam)] and that it regards as a 
provisional, conceptual appearance that nonetheless 
may constitute a step on the way to the true absolute 
truth—namely the uncategorized absolute [Skt. 
aparyāyaparamārtha; Tib. namdrang mayinpai 
döndam (rnam grangs ma yin pa’ i don dam)], 
which is free of any conceptual fabrications [Skt. 
nisprapañca; Tib. thödrel (spros bral)]). Furthermore, 
Mipham made it clear that the negation involved is 
not truly an absolute, nonimplicative, nonaffirming 
one. In fact, since Tsongkhapa’s object of negation 
was inherent / hypostatic existence, which is utterly 
nonexistent—as such being like a hare’s horn—
and he required the purportedly merely existent 
phenomenon on which the inherent / hypostatic 
existence had been projected, to persist after the 
wrong mode of existence projected on it dissolved, 
the negation in question must imply the existence of 
the purportedly “merely existent phenomenon” that 
is the basis on which one projects the false mode 
of existence that is negated, and hence must be an 
implicative / affirming negation.
Mahāmādhyamaka and Uma Zhentongpa 
(dbu ma gzhan stong pa; Skt. reconstruction, 
paraśūnyatāvāda) use a negation in their discursive 
explanations of voidness that is clearly of the 
affirmative or implicative kind, for it negates all 
that is not the dharmakāya, or Buddha-nature, or 
dharmatā—i.e. the true condition of reality—while 
leaving this condition unnegated: the dharmakāya 
(of however one calls the absolute) is said to be 
empty of substances other than itself. However, 
negation, either of this or of another kind, certainly 
does not take place in the Contemplation state of 
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this school—even though Dölpopa Sherab Gyaltsen 
may have failed to stress this fact. Paradoxically, 
Tsongkhapa disqualified Dölpopa because of his use 
of an affirming, implicative negation—which, as 
shown above, is the type of negation he himself used, 
even though he asserted it to be of the alternative 
type!
The above is the reason why Gendün Chöphel 
illustrated nonimplicative, nonaffirming, absolute 
negation with the simultaneous negation of the 
four extreme positions regarding being: because 
such negation does not allow the mind to entertain, 
hypostatize and reify any concept whatsoever, and 
hence it may lead the reasoning / understanding 
mind to collapse together with the whole of its 
conceptual comprehension (cf. the upcoming, 
enlarged, revised versions of a couple of works of 
mine: Capriles, 2004, 2005 [the latter in Chöphel, 
2005].)
Mipham also made it clear that the Prāsangika 
absolute is not the result of a negation of any kind. 
John Pettit (1999) wrote (terms in brackets my own 
additions):
According to Mipham, [purportedly] absolute 
negation is a suitable way to conceptualize the 
absolute for beginners, but because it is still a 
conceptual formula, it does not represent the 
final significance of nonelaboration (Skt. nis-
prapañca; Tib. trödrel [spros bral]). It is a mere 
nonsubstantiality (Tib. dngos med), as opposed 
to substantial existence (Tib. ngos po). It corre-
sponds to the analytical wisdom (Skt. prajñā; 
Tib. sherab [shes rab]) of the post-meditative 
state and is adequate to emptiness as an object of 
... thought but not to the nonconceptual gnosis 
of sublime equipoise (Skt. āryajñāna; Tib. phag-
pai yeshe [’phags pa’ i ye shes]).” (p. 109)
Moreover, the experience of voidness produced 
by what Tsongkhapa viewed as an absolute 
negation involves the illusion of substantiality, for 
as Gendün Chöphel rightly noted, within sam.  s āra 
all experiences involve the illusion in question—
and the apprehension of the subtle concept (i.e., the 
universal, abstract concept of an entity that results 
from a mental synthesis [Skt. arthasāmānya; Tib. 
don spy]) of what Tsongkhapa called non-inherent 
existence would be no exception to this rule. So 
what results from this is the illusion of a substantial 
insubstantiality!
Above, reference was made to Mahāmādhya-
maka, to Uma Zhentongpa, to the Tibetan 
Master who used these terms to refer to his own 
understanding of Mādhyamaka—Dölpopa Sherab 
Gyaltsen (dol po pa shes rab rgyal mtshan, 1292-1361), 
founder of the Jonangpa ( jo nang pa) School—and 
to the fact that they assert the absolute to be empty 
of substances other than itself. However, readers who 
are not familiar with the different interpretations of 
Mādhyamaka probably failed to fully understand 
their position.
On most occasions, this Master and school 
explained the absolute (Skt. paramārtha; Tib. 
döndam [don dam]) as a positivity—yet sometimes 
they explained it as a negation of the implicative 
kind. Although Dölpopa’s contribution to Buddhist 
philosophy is immeasurable, as he helped unravel the 
highest meaning of both Mādhyamaka and Third 
and Second Promulgation canonical sources, the 
fact that he alternatively explained the absolute as 
a positivity and as a negation, amounted to positing 
extreme views that fall short of the mark. Moreover, 
he went so far as to assert the dharmakāya to be self-
existent, which is even more extreme, for as I have 
noted elsewhere (Capriles, 2004; cf. the upcoming, 
definitive version) in the context of putting forward 
my own version of Mahāmādhyamaka, the 
dharmakāya may not be legitimately said to be either 
existent or nonexistent—and hence far less may it 
legitimately be said to be self-existent or inherently 
nonexistent. However, for all of this to be properly 
understood, first of all the reasons why Dölpopa 
occasionally explained the absolute as an implicative 
negation must be made clear. 
The Samdhinirmocanasūtra distinguishes three 
so-called “natures”: (1) what it refers to as absolutely 
true, abiding nature (Skt. parinispanna; Tib. 
yongdrub [yongs grub]), which is the ultimate; (2) 
what it calls dependent nature (Skt. paratantra; Tib. 
zhenwang [gzhan dbang]), which is whatever arises 
from causes and conditions other than itself (hence 
its name), or arises without being able to remain by 
its own power more than a moment, or is produced 
from the seed (Skt. vāsanā; Tib. bagchag [bag chags]) 
that is its own respective internal latency, and which 
is thus held to consist in the interdependent arising 
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of both subject and its manifold objects; (3) what 
it calls imputational nature (Skt. parikalpita; Tib. 
kuntag [kun brtags]), which consists on the thought-
contents one superimposes on phenomena of the 
dependent nature, and which it holds to be the real 
source of defilements because it is the perception 
of sensory data as being inherently this or that that 
activates the passions. (This classification is not 
self-evident, for one questions how can there be an 
interdependent arising of the different entities that 
make up the dependent nature in the absence of 
the superimposition of thought-contents on sensory 
data.)
At any rate, the sūtra in question makes the 
point that what it calls dependent nature is an 
ultimate non-nature (paramārthanihsvabhāvatā; Tib. 
döndampa ngowonyi [don dam pa ngo bo nyid med 
pa]) in that it is not the ultimate. However, since the 
absolutely true, abiding nature must be an agent of 
purification on a Path, and the source of defilements 
is said to be the nature it calls imputational nature, 
which consists on the concepts one superimposes on 
the dependent nature—for as noted above it is the 
perception of sensory data as being inherently this or 
that that activates the passions—various passages in 
that sūtra reduce the absolutely true, abiding nature 
to the mere lack of the imputational nature. In other 
words, the absolutely true, abiding nature is reduced 
to the fact that entities of the imputational nature 
do not exist “by way of their own character” (Skt. 
svabhāvalaksan. asiddhi; Tib. ranggi tsennyikyi drubpa 
[rang gi mtshan nyid kyis grub pa])—to which most 
Gelugpas would add, “as the referents of a conceptual 
consciousness.” To express it differently, it reduces 
the absolutely true, abiding nature to the mere fact 
that entities of the dependent nature are not what 
one experiences them as being when an imputational 
nature is projected on them. On the basis of this 
fact, both the Cittamātrins and Je Tsongkhapa (the 
latter, in his interpretation of Cittamātra), reduced 
the absolutely true, abiding nature to a purported 
nonaffirming, nonimplicative, absolute negation—
which Mādhyamika-Svātantrika-Yogācāras of the 
Śāntaraksita-Kamalaśīla tradition, modifying the 
object of the negation, posited as an ultimate, though 
not so as the true and final absolute that they called 
uncategorized absolute (Skt. aparyāyaparamārtha; 
Tib. namdrang mayinpai döndam [rnam grangs ma 
yin pa’ i don dam] and that was free of conceptual 
fabrications [Skt. nisprapañca; Tib. thödrel (spros 
bral)]): for them it was no more than a categorized 
ultimate (Skt. paryāyaparamārtha; Tib. namdrangpai 
döndam [rnam grangs pa’ i don dam]) that they rightly 
identified as a provisional, conceptual appearance, 
which, nonetheless, in their view could be a step on 
the way to the true absolute truth.
In the context of their own system, Cittamātrins 
may as well posit a purported nonaffirming, 
nonimplicative, absolute negation as the ultimate, but 
it would be illegitimate—to say the least—to posit 
a negation of the kind (even if it negated an object 
slightly different from that of the Cittamātras) as the 
absolute truth [Skt. paramārthasatya; Tib. döndam 
denpa (don dam bdem pa)] of the Mādhyamaka 
Prāsangika, which has been established by this 
school to be utterly free of conceptual fabrications 
[Skt. nisprapañca; Tib. thödrel (spros bral)]). And 
nonetheless this was what Tsongkhapa did, for 
throughout his writings he reduced the ultimate of 
the Prāsangikas to the presence of an absence, while 
bitterly criticizing the definition of the absolute as 
free of conceptual fabrications. (For clarification 
of these points with the exception of the last, cf. 
Hopkins, 2002; for the last point, cf. the upcoming 
definitive versions of Capriles, 2005, 2004.)
Back to Dölpopa, his conception of the 
absolute as an implicative negation is indivisible 
from his conception of the absolutely true, abiding 
nature (Skt. parinispanna; Tib. yongdrub [yongs 
grub]) posited by Third Promulgation Sūtras, 
which is in stark contrast to both the Cittamātrins’ 
and Tsongkhapa’s. In fact, on the basis of 
higher Third Promulgation canonical sources 
(which include the Mahāparinirvān. asūtra, the 
Mahābherīhārakaparivartasūtra, the Angulimāla- 
sūtra, Suvarn.aprabhāsasūtra, the Lankāvatārasūtra, 
the Āryaśrīmālādevīsimhanādanāmamahqyanasūtra 
and others), of Tantras (such as the Kālacakra)
tantra and the Hevajratantra) and of higher 
Indian Mahāyāna texts (such as, e.g. Maitreya’s 
Ratnagotravibhāga / Uttaratantraśāstra [Mahāyā- 
nottaratantraśāstra]) and so on, Dölpopa established 
the ultimately abiding nature (Skt. parinis.panna or 
parinispanna-laks.an. a; Tib. yongdrub [yongs grub] 
or [chönyi] yongdrubkyi tsennyi [(chos nyid) yongs 
grub kyi mtshan nyid]): (1) to be the dharmakāya 
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or the Buddha-nature; (2) to be endowed with 
Buddha-qualities; and (3)—citing a passage from 
the Angulimālasūtra—to be empty not only of 
the imaginary projections proper to the imaginary 
nature (Skt. parikalpita or parikalpitalaks.an.a; Tib. 
kuntag [kun brtags] or kuntagkyi tsennyi [kun brtags 
kyi mtshan nyid])—which are the source of the 
passions and which in terms of the Pramān. avāda 
tradition are general configurations / general 
collections of characteristics (Skt. sāmānyalaks.an. a; 
Tib. chitsen [spyi mtshan])—but also of the relative 
phenomena that constitute the other-produced 
nature (Skt. paratantra or paratantralaks.an. a; Tib. 
zhenwang [gzhan dbang] or zhenwangi tsennyi 
[gzhan dbang gi mtshan nyid]), which in terms of 
current, popular interpretations of the Pramān.avāda 
of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti are specifically 
characterized phenomena, self-patterns or inherent 
collections of characteristics (Skt. svalaks.an.a; 
Tib. rangtsen [rang mtshan]). He wrote with regard 
to the absolutely true, abiding nature which (is) 
the Buddha-nature endowed with the qualities 
of Buddhahood (in Hopkins, 2002, p. 286): 
Of what is it devoid? It is devoid of whatever 
is an imputational or an other-produced nature, 
conventional forms and so on. (Hopkins, 2002, 
p. 286)
It was on the basis of the indisputable fact that 
all phenomena of both the dependent nature (Skt. 
paratantra; Tib. zhenwang [gzhan dbang]) and the 
imaginary nature (Skt. parikalpita; Tib. kuntag 
[kun brtags]) are utterly natureless (Skt. asvabhāva / 
svabhāvato nāstikam; Tib. ngowonyi machi panyi [ngo 
bo nyid ma mchi pa nyid] / ngowonyi mepa [ngo bo 
nyid med pa]), and that therefore the Buddha-nature 
that is the absolutely true, abiding nature is free 
from all possible substances other than itself, that 
Dölpopa came to concede that it was legitimate to 
identify the absolute (Skt. paramārtha; Tib. döndam 
[don dam]) with emptiness—but only if emptiness 
were understood as the total absence of substances 
other than the absolutely true, abiding nature (Skt. 
parinispanna; Tib. yongdrub [yongs grub]) which 
is the Buddha-nature endowed with the qualities 
of Buddhahood, and hence if emptiness were 
understood as an implicative negation excluding 
both the dependent and imaginary natures, yet 
maintaining the absolutely true, abiding nature.
I fully agree that the absolutely true, abiding 
nature (Skt. parinis.panna; Tib. yongdrub [yongs 
grub]) is the Buddha-nature endowed with the 
qualities of Buddhahood, and that this nature is 
free from purported (yet nonexistent) substances of 
both the dependent and the imaginary natures, and 
hence from all possible substances other than itself—
and that therefore Cittamātrins were wrong in 
concluding, on the basis of the Samdhinirmocanasūtra 
alone, that whereas phenomena of the imaginary 
nature are natureless, the same is not the case 
with phenomena of the dependent nature—thus 
mistakenly implying the absolutely true, abiding 
nature not to be empty of what, by implication, 
would be substances of the dependent nature, 
and thereby implying that the specifically 
characterized phenomena, self-patterns or inherent 
collections of characteristics (Skt. svalaks.an. a; 
Tib. rangtsen [rang mtshan]) of the Pramān. avāda are 
true, independently existing realities (no wonder, 
then, that most Tibetan doxographers classified 
Dignāga and Dharmakīrti as Cittamātrins).
However, as noted above, viewing the 
absolutely true, abiding nature as either a positivity 
or a negation of any possible kind, is as inadmissible 
to me as Je Tsongkhapa’s and the Cittamātra 
School’s respective conceptions of the absolute as 
a purportedly nonimplicative negation. John Pettit 
(1999, pp. 109-110), following Lipman (1981), 
expressed the ideas Ju Mipham laid out in his 
commentary to Śāntaraksita’s Madhyamakālamkāra 
(translation adapted to my terminology) as follows:
the definitive absolute (don dam mtshan nyid 
pa) must be understood as the nonconceptual 
absolute that is revealed (to) superior (Skt. 
ārya; Tib. phagpa [’phags pa]) bodhisattvas in 
their Contemplation state (Skt. samāhita; Tib. 
nyamzhak [mnyam bzhag]). The indivisibility 
(Skt. yuganaddha; Tib. zungjug [zung ’ jug]) of 
appearance and emptiness is the [true] absolute, 
[which (is)] nonconceptual [and hence nondual], 
and [which (is)] the content of the nondual 
primordial gnosis of superior bodhisattvas. 
[In fact,] this is the absolute according to 
Candrakīrti’s Prāsangika Mādhyamaka, which 
is accessed by a valid Gnition investigating the 
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nonconceptual absolute. As it is free from mental 
fabrications (Skt. nisprapañca; Tib. trödrel [spros 
bral]), it is beyond affirmation and negation.” 
(Note that instead of saying that the true 
absolute is the indivisibility (Skt. yuganaddha; 
Tib. zungjug [zung ’ jug]) of appearance and 
emptiness I myself would have said instead that 
it is unutterable, yet involves the indivisibility of 
appearance and emptiness.)
Since affirmation and negation are relative to 
each other, the absolute, which is that which is not 
relative, simply could not be either positive or nega-
tive. In fact, since the absolute may not be conceived 
in the dichotomous terms of secondary process—
that is, in terms of concepts—it could not involve 
negation. Also, since, as emphasized by Buddhist 
logic, in logical terms positivity results from the ne-
gation of a negation, the absolute could not be pos-
itive either.
For Dölpopa’s views, cf. Dol-bo-ba (2006), 
Hopkins (2002) and Stearns (2010).
7.    Dbu ma spyi don nges don rab gsal, p. 446b. In The 
Complete Works of the Sakya Scholars, vol. 12. To-
kyo: Toyo Bunko, 1969. Thakchoe’s translation had 
conventional instead of relative. Here one of the 
phrases in brackets inserted by Thakchoe was deleted 
and another one inserted instead, as I felt his view as 
a Tsongkhapa follower was affecting his interpreta-
tion and hence his translation of Gorampa’s words. 
For evaluating this translation, cf. the Tibetan origi-
nal in the next paragraph of this note.
The Tibetan original reads: zhes pa’ i skabs nas 
bstan pa’ i kun rdzob bden pa ni med de / yul can 
mthong ba brdzun pa med pa / de’ i yul med pa’ i phyir 
ro //. Thus readers knowing Tibetan may appreciate 
that the translation offered is faithful to the original.
8.    Kun mkhyen pad ma dkar po, dbu ma’ i gzhung 
gsum gsal byed, p. 121 (Saarnath, UP, India: Kargyud 
Student’s Welfare Committee). For evaluating this 
translation, cf. the Tibetan original: ji srid sgrib pa’ i 
lhag ma yod pa de srid du / rjes thob pas snang ba’ i sna 
tshogs ’ de dag sgyu ma lta bu la sogs par snang la / nam 
bag chags thams cad yongs su dag pa na rnam pa thams 
cad du kun rdzob kyi chos snang ma myong ba rang 
bzhin nyid la dus thams cad du mnyam par ’ jog pa yin 
no //. Thus readers knowing Tibetan may appreciate 
that the translation offered is faithful to the original.
9.    The grammatical errors were in the Wikipedia text 
as accessed on September 2, 2010.
10. Was Nāgārjuna aware of the concept of the neutral 
condition of the base-of-all? According to the tra-
ditions of the Nyingmapa (rnying ma pa) School 
of Tibetan Buddhism codified in the authoritative 
treatise Feast for the Erudite: A History of the Dhar-
ma (Chöjung Khepai Gatön [chos ’byung mkhas 
pa’s dga’ ston]) written by Pawo Tsuglag Threngwa 
(dpa’ bo gtsug lag phreng ba: 1504-1566), Nāgārju-
na and Āryadeva were lineage holders in one of the 
two main lines of transmission of Dzogchen Atiy-
oga (Cf. Chögyal Namkhai Norbu, 1988)—which 
some have taken to imply that the Mādhyamaka is 
a philosophical explanation, adapted to the gradual 
Mahāyāna, of the essential View of Dzogchen Ati.
11.   Tib. zhentong (gzhan stong); reconstructed Skt. 
paraśūnya: literally emptiness (i.e., lack) of extraneous 
substances, the meaning of the term is that of the 
Tibetan zhengyi ngöpo tongpanyi (gzhan gyi dngos po 
stong pa nyid)—emptiness of substances extraneous 
[to the single true nature of reality]. To Dölpopa, this 
implied the absolute nonexistence of the paratantra 
posited by the Cittamātras. Cf. note 4 (for more detail, 
cf. Chöphel & Capriles, 2013, and the upcoming 
definitive versions of Capriles, 2004, 2005).
12. Actually, the teachings in question also posit a se-
quence of sixteen levels (Skt. bhūmi; Tib. sa), but do 
so mainly to show that after the final achievement 
of the Anuyoga, which is the highest attainment af-
ter those proper to Dzogchen Ati, a practitioner of 
Dzogchen Ati still has a distance to travel—which 
will involve going, while in this life, through the 
intermediate state of the true condition of phenom-
ena (Skt. dharmatā antarābhava; Tib. chönyi bardo 
[chos nyid bar do]), as it is in that state that Thögel is 
applied. (However, this does not mean that practi-
tioners of Dzogchen Ati must first practice the other 
vehicles: the supreme vehicle has its own, especially 
swift methods for attaining its realizations.)
13. A second line of development is the Graves-inspired 
one that Wilber has called values / spiral dynamics, 
having as a first rung, on the right, one that is 
centered on survival and that is at the same level of 
the first rung of the first line; as a second rung on the 
right, what he called the kin spirits, corresponding to 
the first rung on the left, which is the one he called 
magic-animistic—both of which are the level of the 
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second rung in the first line; as a third rung on the 
right what he called the power gods, corresponding 
to the second rung on the left, which is the one he 
called egocentric—both of which are the level of the 
third rung in the first line; as a fourth rung on the 
right what he called the truth force, corresponding 
to the third rung on the left, which is the one he 
called absolutistic—both of which are at the level of 
the fourth rung in the first line; as a fifth rung on the 
right what he called the strive drive, corresponding 
to the fourth rung on the left, which is the one he 
called multiplistic—both of which are at the level of 
the fifth rung in the first line; as a sixth rung on the 
right what he called the human bond, corresponding 
to the fifth rung on the left, which is the one he 
called relativistic—both of which are at the level of 
the sixth rung in the first line; as a seventh rung 
on the right the one he called flex-flow, which is at 
the level of the seventh rung in the first line; and 
as an eighth rung on the right the one he called 
global view, which is at the level of the eighth rung 
in the first line—with what he called the systemic 
as the sixth rung on the left, placed between the 
corresponding seventh and eighth rungs of both the 
first line and the right of the second line (this second 
line hence not reaching beyond the eighth level of 
the first line, and thus not reaching the third tier).
The third line is the Kegan-inspired one of 
orders of consciousness, beginning with Orders 0, 
1st, 2d, 3d, 4th and 4.5, which are, respectively, at the 
level of the six lower stages of the first line and of the 
right side of the second line, and ending with the 5th 
Order, which lies at the level of the eighth stage of 
both the first line and the right of the second line. 
This line thus does not reach the third tier.
The fourth is the Loevinger/Cook/Greuter-
inspired line of self-identity that includes eight rungs 
referred to as symbiotic, impulsive, self-protective, 
conformist, conscientious, individualistic, autono-
mous and integrated, which are at the level of the 
eight lower rungs of the first line and the right of 
the second line, followed by an ninth stage, called 
construct-aware—at the level of global mind in 
the first line—and a final, tenth stage, called ego-
aware—which lies at the level of meta-mind on the 
first line. The last two rungs are within the third tier.
The fifth is the Gebser-inspired line of 
worldviews, which goes from the archaic (at the level 
of the first rung of lines one, three and four, as well 
as of the right of the second line) through the magic 
(between the second and third rungs of the first, 
third and fourth lines, and of the right of the second 
line), the mythic, the rational and the pluralistic (at 
the level of the fourth, firth and sixth rungs of the 
first, third and fourth lines, as well as of the right 
of the second line, respectively), up to the integral 
(at the level of the systemic on the left of the second 
line). This line does not reach into the third tier.
Finally, the sixth is the Fowler-inspired line 
of stages of faith, going from (0) the one he called 
undifferentiated (at the level of the first rung of the 
first, third, fourth and fifth lines, as well as of the 
right of the second line), through (1) the magical 
(at the level of the second rung of the first, third 
and fourth lines, as well as the right of the second 
line), (2) the mythic-literal (at the level of the third 
rung of the first, third and fourth lines, as well as 
of the right of the second line), (3) the conventional 
(at the level of the fourth rung of the first, third and 
fourth lines, as well as of the right of the second 
line—which as already noted are at the level of 
the third rung of the fifth line), (4) the individual-
reflexive (at the level of the fifth rung of the first, 
third and fourth lines, as well as of the right of the 
second line, and at the level of the fourth rung of 
the fifth line), (5) the conjunctive (at the level of the 
sixth rung of the first, third and fourth lines, as well 
as of the right of the second line, and of the fifth 
rung of the fifth line), and (6) the universalizing-
commonwealth, which is at the level of the systemic 
at the left of the second line and of the integral on 
the fifth line. Hence this line does not reach into the 
third tier, either.
14.  H. A. Orr is Shirley Cox Kearns Professor of Biolo-
gy at the University of Rochester.
15.  Yoshihiro Francis Fukuyama, reported to be a State 
Department publicist and often referred to as such, 
is the author who became famous for his book The 
End of History and the Last Man (Fukuyama, 1992), 
in which he proposed that there were no longer al-
ternatives to Capitalist, anti-ecological consumer-
ism—which, were it true, would mean that there are 
no alternatives to the self-destruction of our species.
16. Though Carlson omitted these facts, Aurobindo 
moved within extreme left-wing anarchist circles in 
France and then, back in India, adopted one of the 
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most extreme positions among activists of the inde-
pendence movement. It was after he received death 
threats that he abandoned his activism and went into 
seclusion, devoting himself solely to spiritual prac-
tice, teaching and writing.
17. The only version of the book in question I have is 
[a photocopy of] the 1995 original edition, as Boli-
varian Venezuela’s foreign currency restrictions pre-
vent me from buying all books published by tran-
spersonal and integral theorists. Moreover, even in 
the absence of these impediments, I would not buy 
all of Wilber’s works as he publishes them, as I have 
so much to read for the research at the root of the 
several books I am writing; moreover, Wilber is a 
secondary matter in my writing, which must address 
many far more important views and points—and, 
moreover, for me reading him is not a pleasant task.
18. The source Wilber (2001b, note 1, pp. 717-741) gave 
for his presentation of the progressive attainment of 
the four kāyas is none else than the infamous Geshe 
Kelsang Gyamtso (usually written without the “m” 
in Gyamtso; cited repeatedly by Wilber in the same 
note, pp. 726-729), leader of the most recently cre-
ated Tibetan Buddhist School, which is universal-
ly viewed by Tibetans (except for members of the 
school in question) as the terrorist organization that 
committed a bloody triple murder against important 
associates of the Dalai Lama and that has repeated-
ly tried to murder the illustrious Buddhist Master 
and Tibetan political leader. Concerning these ac-
cusations, cf. the original Newsweek article (Clifton 
& Miller, 1997) and the book with the exhaustive 
investigation by Raimondo Bultrini (2008), among 
other sources.
19. This is the reason why, in spite of conceding that the 
etymological meaning of both the Sanskrit term 
samvrti and Tibetan term kundzob (kun rdzob), 
which as a rule are rendered as relative or, in Ge-
lugpa translations, conventional, was the one offered 
in Vol. I of The Beyond Mind Papers: Transperson-
al and Metatranspersonal Theory (Capriles, in press) 
and notes to Vol. II of the same book—namely that 
of all-concealing, which for me has the implica-
tion of all-distorting—in his Tsashe Tikchen Rigpai 
Gyamtso (rtsa shes tik chen rigs pa’ i mrgya mtso, pp. 
402-403 [Saarnath, UP, India: Gelugpa Students 
Welfare Committee, 1992]; cf. Thakchoe, 2007, p. 
47) he asserted relative or conventional reality not 
to be always all-concealing / all-distorting. This is 
because he posited a mere existence which in his 
view was warranted, valid, and correct, and an in-
herent / hypostatic existence that he deemed to be a 
mere illusion and as such unwarranted, wrong and 
invalid—for it was the most basic manifestation 
of the unawareness cum delusion that the Buddha 
Śākyamuni called avidyā (Pāli: avijjā; Tib. ma rig 
pa). This assertion of a mere existence that was a rel-
ative, yet not all-concealing / all-distorting reality 
was contested by nearly all non-Gelugpas, and with 
the passing of time it was objected even by a number 
of Gelugpas.
20. The Tibetan zhenngo khelen (gzhan ngo khas len) is 
related to the Sanskrit paraprasiddha (Tib. zhenla 
drakpa [gzhan la grags pa] or simply zhendrak [gzhan 
grags]), though it does not have exactly the same 
meaning. The assertions called zhenngo khelen are 
the opposite of self-directed assertions (Tib. rangyü 
dukhe lenpa [rang rgyud du khes len pa]—which for 
its part is related to the Sanskrit svaprasiddha and 
the Tibetan rangla drakpa [rang la grags pa] or sim-
ply rangdrak [rang grags]), though it does not have 
exactly the same meaning. Since Tsongkhapa does 
not accept the existence of other-directed assertions, 
he redefined the term in such a way that all asser-
tions are of the kind that the original Prāsangika 
called self-directed.
21. This would be correct if nirodha were understood 
as the mere cessation of suffering that constitutes 
the Third Noble Truth (Skt. duhkha-nirodha-ārya-
satya), yet is utterly wrong when understood in the 
sense of lack of manifestation or blankness—which 
is what the nirodha of nirodhasamāpatti that Wilber 
takes as paradigmatic is.
22. For the Mādhyamaka Prāsangika School emptiness 
is, indeed, emptiness of self-existence (Skt. svabhāva 
śūnyatā; Tib. rangtong [rang stong] or rangzhingyi 
tongpanyi [rang bzhin gyi stong pa nyid]—except 
for Je Tsongkhapa, who preferred rangzhingyi 
madrubpa [rang bzhin gyis ma grub pa]; Chin. 
Hànyǔ Pīnyīn, zìxìngkòng; Wade-Giles, tzu-hsing-
k’ung]; Jap. jishōkū). As noted in the regular text 
after the reference mark for this note, Je Tsongkhapa 
and the great bulk of his Gelugpa brethen—
and recently also the so-called New Kadampas, 
headed by the reported source of Wilber’s last four 
fulcra—on the basis of the Svātantrikas’ categorized 
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(conceptual, lower, provisional) ultimate truth 
(Skt. aparyāyaparamārtha; Tib. namdrang mayinpai 
döndam [rnam grangs ma yin pa’ i don dam]) that is 
found through the method of insight meditation 
(Pāli: vipassanā; Skt. vipaśyanā; Tib. lhantong [lhag 
mthong]; Chin. Hànyǔ Pīnyīn: guān; Wade-Giles, 
kuan; Jap. kan]) expounded in the Bhāvanākramas 
by Svātantrika Masters Śāntaraksita and Kamalaśīla, 
misunderstood the Prāsangika emptiness as 
consisting in the presence of an absence—namely, 
as being the absence of the “inherent / hypostatic or 
true existence” we mistakenly project on and perceive 
in all entities, which they assert to become present in 
the insight meditation that Je Tsongkhapa borrowed 
from the Bhāvanākramas by the aforementioned 
Svātantrika Masters, when applied on the basis of 
the system devised by Tsongkhapa.
On the contrary, according to the 
Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra (which the Chinese 
attribute to Nāgārjuna and is extant in Kumārajīva’s 
Chinese translation only), the Dzogchen teachings, 
the original Indian and the non-Gelug Tibetan 
understanding of Mādhyamaka Prāsangika, and 
the Mahāmādhyamaka School, the absolute is not 
a mere emptiness of self-existence. In particular, 
Nyingmapa Masters have insisted that such an 
emptiness cannot be the absolute truth, because 
the latter, which is fully patent in Buddhahood, is 
the source and true condition of everything and, in 
particular, is the source of the qualities inherent in 
Buddhahood—whereas emptiness thus conceived 
cannot account for the manifestation, either of the 
universe or of the qualities proper to Buddhahood.
For example, according to Sakyapa Master 
Gorampa Sönam Sengé (go rams pa bsod nams seng 
ge: 1429-1489), absolute or ultimate truth is no other 
than primordial gnosis (Skt. jñāna; Tib. yeshe [ye 
shes]) itself (Thakchoe, 2007, p. 13), which rather 
than being the presence of a mere absence, is a fully 
active plenitude. He wrote (cited in Thakchoe, 2007, 
p. 15; the translation was adapted to the terminology 
used in this book):
 Here in the Madhyamaka system, the object 
itself cannot be divided into the two truths. 
Relative truth and absolute truth are established 
in terms of modes of apprehension (mthong 
tshul): in terms of the [spurious mental] subject 
apprehending falsehood and the Awareness 
apprehending truth; or of mistaken and 
unmistaken apprehensions (’ khrul ma ’ khrul); or 
of deluded or undeluded apprehensions (rmongs 
ma rmongs); or of erroneous or nonerroneous 
apprehensions (phying ci log ma log), or of valid 
Gnition or invalid cognition (tshad ma yin 
min).” (Ngedön Rabsel [nges don rab gsal], p. 
375b; careful substantiation in p. 375b-d.)
The view according to which the absolute or 
ultimate truth is no other than undeluded primordial 
gnosis, and relative truth is the deluded perspective 
of the obscured consciousness of sentient beings, is 
shared by the most widely acclaimed Masters of all 
Tibetan Schools except for the Gelug: Longchen 
Rabjampa, Sakya Pan.d. ita, Rongtön Shakya 
Gyaltsen, Ju Mipham, Taksang Lotsawa, Shakya 
Chogden, the Eighth Karmapa Mikyö Dorje, 
Gendün Chöphel and so on (all of these Masters 
except for Gendün Chöphel are listed in Thakchoe 
[2007, p. 15]; as for Chöphel, cf. Chöphel [2005]).
The great Nyingmapa Master Rongzom Pan.d. ita 
(Rongzompa Chökyi Zangpo [rong zom pa chos kyi 
bzang po]), rather than positing emptiness as the 
absolute truth, asserted the latter to consist in the 
true condition of [all] phenomena (Skt. dharmatā; 
Tib. chönyi [chos nyid]). However, this should not 
be taken to mean that the absolute truth is not 
or cannot be emptiness, for both terms are often 
regarded as synonyms. In fact, Ju Mipham agreed 
that emptiness may be the absolute truth, but only 
if emptiness is not understood as a negation. Karma 
Phuntsho (2005, p. 9; terminology adapted to the 
one used in this book) wrote: 
The Gelugpas understood the ultimate qua 
emptiness to be an absence of inherent existence 
and therefore a nonimplicative negation…
[Ju] Mipham, on the contrary, argued 
that the absolute qua emptiness, in its highest 
form, is not merely an absence of inherent 
existence. He enumerated two kinds of 
ultimate, the conceptual, provisional ultimate 
(Skt. paryāyaparamārtha; Tib. rnam grangs pa’ i 
don dam) and the nonconceptual definitive 
absolute (Skt. aparyāyaparamārtha; Tib. rnam 
grangs ma yin pa’ i don dam), and relegated the 
mere absence of inherent existence to the level 
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of conceptual, provisional ultimate, which, also 
known as the ultimate that is concordant [with 
the absolute (condition)] (Skt. paramārthānukūla 
[-paramārtha]; Tib. döndampa dang thunpai 
döndampa [don dam pa dang mthun pa (’ i don 
dam pa)]), eliminates only partial extremes and 
serves as a step on the way to the nonconceptual, 
definitive absolute. The nonconceptual, 
definitive absolute qua final emptiness, which is 
the quidditas* and the absolute nature of things, 
he argued, is reality free from all fabrications 
(Skt. prapañca; Tib. spros pa) and extremes (Skt. 
anta; Tib. mtha’). He also used terms such as 
total indivisibility (Tib. zung ’ jug chen po [Skt. 
mahāyuganaddha]), Total Middle Way (Tib. dbu 
ma chen po [Skt. mahāmādhyamaka]), Resultant 
Middle Way (Tib. ’bras bu’ i dbu ma [Skt. 
phalamādhyamaka]) and Equality (Tib. mnyam 
nyid [Skt. Skt. samatā; Tib. mnyam nyid) to refer 
to this.
To be or not to be are both extremes, 
and emptiness as the philosophical middle 
way, Mipham argued, must transcend the 
extremes of being and nonbeing, existence 
and nonexistence, negation and affirmation, 
and even the empty and the nonempty. Even 
to perceive emptiness itself would be wrong, 
for there is nothing (not even that nothing!) 
to be perceived. To conceive a thing called 
“emptiness” in discerning emptiness is a gross 
reification, the wrong understanding Nāgārjuna 
repudiated in Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, XIII/8 
and XXIV/11.
For his part, Dölpopa Sherab Gyaltsen (dol po 
pa shes rab rgyal mtshan), his Jonangpa followers 
and many non-Gelug, rime (ris med: non-sectarian) 
Tibetan Masters adhering to Mahāmādhyamaka, 
posit voidness as the absolute truth. However, as 
stated in a previous note, the voidness they posit as 
the absolute is the emptiness of substances other than 
the dharmakāya, or the Buddha-nature, and so forth 
(Tib. zhentong [gzhan stong]; Skt. reconstruction, 
paraśūnyatā)—which is a view both Tsongkhapa 
and his great Sakyapa critic, Gorampa Sönam Senge 
(go rams pa bsod nams seng ge, 1429-1489) most 
emphatically rejected (among other sources, cf. 
Hopkins, 2002; Cabezón, 2003).
The intent behind my criticism is not to make 
Wilber embrace the non-Gelug understanding 
of the absolute, but to expose his confusion and 
contradictions, for if he embraced the standard 
Gelug description of the progressive attainment 
of the four kāyas, then by implication he was 
adopting the standard Gelug view of the ultimate as 
emptiness qua presence of an absence, from which 
the description in question is inextricable—but 
then he is forbidden from identifying it with the 
Base of Dzogchen, which is not a mere voidness, or 
with Ayin, which is not a mere absence. Also, if he 
embraced the non-Gelug views according to which 
the absolute is primordial gnosis, the dharmatā, or 
an emptiness that is not a mere absence, and so forth, 
or the related Dzogchen view according to which 
the complete manifestation of what the Mahāyāna 
calls the absolute (the Dzogchen teachings place no 
emphasis whatsoever on the concept of “absolute”) 
is the Base, Path and Fruit of Dzogchen, then the 
absolute cannot be Tsongkhapa’s emptiness (which, 
at any rate, does not match Wilber’s descriptions 
of emptiness) and, by implication, Wilber may not 
adhere to Tsongkhapa’s description of the progressive 
attainment of the kāyas, as the latter is inextricable 
from Tsongkhapa’s conception of the ultimate truth. 
In other words, once more Wilber incurred in the 
repeatedly denounced error of viewing incompatible 
concepts pertaining to incompatible systems as being 
just the same, as though he were a bootstrapper who 
has produced a superior synthesis of all teachings—
when what he has actually done is to obliterate the 
most essential distinctions in Buddhism and in this 
way produce a confusion that may block advance on 
the Path to Awakening.
*The term quidditas is understood here in the sense 
of the Aristotelian to ti en einai or “that which [an 
essent] was before having come into being”—i.e., 
that which it (is) in truth—rather than in the 
Thomistic sense of form that, united to matter, 
determines what a thing is, or in the sense of essence 
in which the term is generally understood in Western 
philosophy.
23.  In some sūtras that negate existence, one finds the 
term “existence” qualified by an adjective or by an 
adverb; for example, in the Sutra of Transcendent 
Discriminating Wisdom in One Hundred Thousand 
Stanzas (Skt. Śatasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā; Tib. 
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[short] Bum Do [’bum mdo]; [middle] Sherphin Tong-
trak Gyapa Do [sher phyin stong phrag brgya pa mdo]; 
[in full] shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa stong phrag 
brgya pa mdo) one can find the term “existence” cate-
gorized as “absolute” or “ultimate” (Skt. paramārtha; 
Tib. döndam [don dam]). Likewise, in the works by 
Nāgārjuna, in a few occasions he referred to the ex-
istence he negated by the term “self-existence” (Skt. 
svabhāva; Tib. rangzhin [rang bzhin]). However, in 
the works by Candrakīrti the term “self-existence” is 
found quite a few times, as it was Candrakīrti who 
first posited a need to make the meaning of the term 
“existence”—that is, what is to be negated—more 
specific, and in quite a few occasions actually did so.
The insight (Skt. vipaśyanā; Tib. lhantong 
[lhag mthong]) meditation Je Tsongkhapa taught 
as a means to purportedly arrive at emptiness as 
conceived by the Mādhyamaka Prāsangika was the 
one taught in the Samdhinirmocanasūtra (a Third 
Promulgation text that the Cittamātra—the lower, 
“idealist” school of the Mahāyāna—takes as its root 
canonical source and that is a key source for the 
Mādhyamaka Svātantrika Yogācāra as well [and for 
Mahāmādhyamaka, which, however, contextualizes 
its teachings])—which, as stated in a previous note, 
he adopted in the version that Svātantrika-Yogācāra 
Masters Śāntaraksita and Kamalaśīla produced in 
their respective Bhāvanākramas. Thus overlooking 
the indivisibility between Path and Fruit emphasized 
in the Śūrangamasūtra, among other canonical 
sources, he employed a method of a lower system to 
purportedly arrive at a realization of a higher system. 
So it does not seem to be a mere coincidence that 
he taught the difference between “mere existence” 
and “inherent / hypostatic / reified existence,” which 
seems to be related to that between (1) the nature 
that the Samdhinirmocanasūtra and the Cittamātra 
philosophical school calls dependent nature (Skt. 
paratantra; Tib. zhenwang [gzhan dbang]) and (2) 
the nature that the Samdhinirmocanasūtra and the 
Cittamātra philosophical school call imaginary 
nature (Skt. parikalpita; Tib. kuntag [kun brtags]).  
 In fact, as stated in a previous note, Tsongkhapa 
understood the qualification of existence as true in 
the Tibetan term denpar yöpa (bden par yod pa) or as 
inherent / hypostatic / reified in the Tibetan term 
rangzhingyi yöpa (rang bzhin gyi yod pa) to mean that 
there was another kind of existence that was not true 
or inherent, and hence he coined the term “mere 
existence” (Tib. yöpa tsam [yod pa tsam]) to refer to 
it—which is to some extent similar to the mode of 
existence that the Samdhinirmocanasūtra and the 
Cittamātra school attribute to the dependent nature 
(the definition of which is, however, less specific). An 
example of “mere existence” was the presence in the 
world of the corporeal pattern one typically calls pot, 
and the actuality and functionality of this corporeal 
configuration, which Tsongkhapa viewed as the 
“merely existent pot.” An example of the illusion of 
inherent existence or true existence—which above I 
compared with imaginary nature, even though it is 
not exactly the same—was the delusive apprehension 
of the same corporeal configuration as having a self-
nature (Skt. svabhāva; Tib. rangzhin [rang bzhin]) 
and hence as being a self-existent pot. Having taken 
the distinction between these two senses of the term 
existence as the key to the correct understanding 
of Mādhyamaka, Tsongkhapa systematically 
categorized as inherent / hypostatic / reified, or as 
true, the existence that was the object of negation in 
Mādhyamika refutations (though of course he did 
not insist that these qualifiers should be introduced 
into the Tibetan translations of traditional texts 
each and every time the term existence was used, 
and he did not introduce them each and every time 
he himself used the term in his own texts).
However, though at first sight the distinction 
may seem quite sound, the truth is that it is hardly 
applicable to the experience of sentient beings. In 
fact, so long as threefold avidyā and hence sam. s āra 
is active, whenever one perceives something as ex-
isting or as being (or think of something as existing 
or as being), the super-subtle thought-structure at-
tributing existence or being to that entity is delu-
sorily valued, giving rise to what the Gelugpas refer 
to as the “illusion of inherent existence” or “illusion 
of true existence.” Therefore, for sentient beings in 
sam.  s āra the term “existence” always refers to a de-
lusive phenomenon that manifests in their mental 
continuum—which is roughly what Tsongkhapa, 
on the basis of writings by Candrakīrti, systemat-
ically called inherent existence or true existence. 
Conversely, when one goes beyond sam. s āra one no 
longer perceives anything as existing or as being.
To express it in my own terms, what is normal-
ly understood by being is the delusive phenomenon 
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that results from the delusory valuation-absoluti-
zation of the concept of being, whereas what one 
normally understands by nonbeing is the delusive 
phenomenon that results from the same concept’s 
delusory valuation-absolutization when a negation 
is affixed to it—and when this delusory valuation 
does not occur there is no phenomenon of being and 
hence no nonbeing. Since the Mādhyamikas were 
not heedless people who contradicted the laws of 
logic for the sake of it, it is clear that by denying both 
existence and nonexistence they were asserting the 
delusive character, both of the experience of being 
or existence that results from delusory valuation-ab-
solutization of the concept of being, and of that of 
nonbeing or nonexistence. Thus there is no need to 
categorize the negated existence as inherent or the 
negated nonexistence as utter.
The above term and the distinction at its root 
were rejected by followers of Candrakīrti other 
than those who followed Tsongkhapa, often before 
the latter placed an emphasis on it. Among the 
former it is worth mentioning Indian philosopher-
practitioner Jayānanda and Tibetan philosopher-
practitioners such as Longchen Rabjam, Gorampa 
Sönam Sengé, Rendawa, Rongtön Shakya Gyaltsen, 
Tatsang Lotsawa, Shakya Chogden, Ju Mipham, 
and Gendün Chöphel (Thakchoe, 2007, p. 61)—
and, among twentieth century non-Tibetans, 
Stcherbatsky, Lindtner, Poussin, Singh and Murti, 
who insisted that the appearance of existence is 
always the appearance of inherent existence, for 
no beings experience an existence that is not the 
illusion that Tsongkhapa called inherent existence, 
and that it is therefore superfluous and at the same 
time misleading to emphasize the distinction the 
founder of the Gelug School stressed. In fact, all of 
the aforementioned Tibetan Masters have placed a 
strong emphasis on the etymology of the word that is 
regularly rendered as relative or conventional (truth), 
samvrti (satya); in Gorampa’s version (Thakchoe, op. 
cit., pp. 48-49):
In the first [etymological explanation of] 
samvrtisatya, sam is [an abbreviated form] of 
samyag, meaning ‘reality,’ and vrti means ‘to 
conceal.’ Since it conceals the true meaning of 
reality, delusion—the [mistaken] conception of 
true existence—is a model of kunzob (kun rdzob 
[the Tibetan translation of samvrtisatya])… Satya 
(denpa [bden pa]) means ‘truth.’ It is truth in the 
sense that it appears true from the perspective of 
deluded consciousness. (pp. 48-49)
Gorampa juxtaposed verses 6:23 and 6:28 of 
Candrakīrti’s Madhyamakāvatāra to show that the 
“perceiver of falsities” mentioned in 6:23 is whoever 
is under the power of the timug (gti mug)—bewil-
derment or concealer—referred to in 6:28 (Thak-
choe, op. cit., p. 67).
Translated into Third Promulgation termin-
ology, the above signifies that the absolutely true, 
abiding nature (Skt. parinis.panna; Tib. yongdrub 
[yongs grub]) is empty, not only of the imaginary 
nature (parikalpita; Tib. kuntag [kun brtags]), as the 
Cittamātrins inferred on the basis of many passages 
of the Sam. dhinirmocanasūtra, but also of the 
dependent nature (Skt. paratantra; Tib. zhenwang 
[gzhan dbang]), as Dölpopa Sherab Gyaltsen 
concluded mostly on the basis of the higher Third 
Promulgation Sūtras. (Tsongkhapa’s interest in this 
regard was whether this emptiness was asserted 
from a conventional or an ultimate perspective: 
like Bhāvaviveka, he needed it to be conventionally 
existent while at the same time being ultimately 
nonexistent.) 
Finally, as stated in a previous endnote, the 
Svātantrikas from whom Tsongkhapa borrowed 
the meditation whereby in his view ultimate truth 
was to be realized—namely Śāntaraksita and his 
disciple, Kamalaśīla—like most Svātantrikas (and 
like the Prāsangika Mipham, referred to above in 
this regard) distinguished between two ultimates: 
the true absolute truth, called uncategorized 
absolute (Skt. aparyāyaparamārtha; Tib. rnam grangs 
ma yin pa’ i don dam), which is free from conceptual 
fabrications (Skt. nisprapañca; Tib. spros bral), and 
an ultimate that was not the true absolute truth, 
for it was conceptual—and thus was called the 
categorized ultimate (Skt. paryāyaparamārtha; Tib. 
namdrangpai döndam [rnam grangs pa’ i don dam]) 
or ultimate that is concordant [with the absolute 
(condition)] (Skt. paramārthānukūla [-paramārtha]; 
Tib. döndampa dang thunpai döndampa [don dam 
pa dang mthun pa’ i don dam pa]) because it was 
intended to be an approximate concept that could be 
used to gain a conceptual (and as such by definition 
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imprecise and deforming) understanding of the true 
absolute truth. 
Well, whereas the above Svātantrikas viewed 
the emptiness that resulted from the meditation 
they taught and that consisted in the presence of 
an absence, as a provisional approximation to the 
true absolute (i.e., as a categorized ultimate that 
is concordant with the absolute) after which the 
nonconceptual, direct realization of the true absolute 
truth (namely of the uncategorized absolute) had to 
be realized, Je Tsongkhapa asserted the presence of 
an absence that manifested at the term of the analysis 
to be the only and therefore the true ultimate truth, 
after which no other ultimate had to be realized. 
Therefore, Je Tsongkhapa’s purported Prāsangika 
view in this regard was not only in disagreement with 
the genuine Prāsangika, but was also considerably 
lower than the view of the Svātantrikas.
24. However, this view is in agreement with Mahāyāna 
teachings other than Tsongkhapa’s, such as those 
that refer to the true condition of our human selves 
and the whole of reality by terms such as: (1) true 
condition of phenomena (Skt. dharmatā; Tib. 
dezhinnyi [de bzhin nyid]) / thatness (Skt. tathatā; 
Tib. chönyi [chos nyid]); Chin. Hànyǔ Pīnyīn, 
zhēnrú; Wade-Giles, chen-ju; or Hànyǔ Pīnyīn, rúshì; 
Wade-Giles, ju-shih; Jap. shinnyo or nyoze; (2) kernel 
of Buddhahood (Skt. tathāgatagarbha; Tib. dezhin 
shegpai nyingpo [de bzhin gshegs pa’ i snying po] / Skt. 
sugatagarbha; Tib. desheg nyingpo [de gshegs snying 
po]; Chin. Hànyǔ Pīnyīn, rúláizàng; Wade-Giles, 
ju-lai-tsang]); (3) Buddha-nature (Skt. buddhatā or 
buddhatva; Chin. Hànyǔ Pīnyīn, fóxìng; Wade-Giles 
fo-hsing; Jp. butsushō or busshō] / bhūtatathatā; Chin. 
Hànyǔ Pīnyīn, zhènrú; Wade-Giles, chen-ju]; Jap. 
shinnyo); (4) [with the emphasis on the disclosure 
of the condition in question] absolute truth (Skt. 
paramārthasatya; Tib. nam drangpai döndam [rnam 
grangs pa’ i don dam]; Chin. Hànyǔ Pīnyīn, zhēndì; 
Wade-Giles, chen-ti; Jap. shintai] / Hànyǔ Pīnyīn, 
dìyīyì; Wade-Giles, ti-i-i; Jap. shogitai]; etc.)—so 
long as the truth in question is not identified with 
a negation or with the presence of a mere absence. 
Moreover, it is also in agreement with the view of 
those who, like Ju Mipham, among many others, 
have identified the ultimate as emptiness yet do not 
understand the latter as consisting in a negation / an 
absence’s presence.
The Dzogchen teachings make it clear that the 
true condition of both ourselves as humans and the 
whole of reality is the Base of Dzogchen, which is the 
full, genuine referent of the Mahāyāna concepts listed 
above—all of which fall short of the condition of Dz-
ogchen, as both the understanding and the realization 
of this condition obtained in Mahāyāna Buddhism are 
partial (cf. Chögyal Namkhai Norbu [1984]; Capriles 
[2000, 2003]). In particular, qua Buddha-nature or 
kernel of Buddhahood it is fully actual, and it is said 
to involve two aspects, which are primordial purity or 
katak (ka dag), which is emptiness, and spontaneous 
perfection or lhundrub (lhun grub).
At any rate, it is this Base that Wilber called 
the unborn, changeless ground—even though as 
noted above the Base in question is not at all the 
same as emptiness (and far less as the presence of an 
absence), for according to these teachings emptiness 
is no more than an illusory experience (Tib. nyam 
[nyams]) on the Path or, if understood with regard 
to the Base, Path and Fruit of Dzogchen, only one 
of its aspects: it is the primordial purity or katak 
aspect, which has spontaneous perfection or lhun-
drub as its counterpart—the latter involving the 
spontaneous arising of experience and consummate 
spontaneous functions of the manifest. (Note that 
Wilber spoke of understanding emptiness, when the 
emptiness that is important on the Path, rather than 
an understanding, is a nonconceptual realization.)
25.  The words within the brackets express my explana-
tion of an abbreviation Wilber used instead
26.  In the same paragraph of the regular text I noted that 
emptiness—not qua illusory experience, nor qua an 
entity’s nonexistence or lack of self-existence, but 
in reference to the Base—is only one of the latter’s 
aspects—namely the primordial purity (Tib. katak 
[ka dag]) or essence (Tib. ngowo [ngo bo]) aspect. If 
the emptiness that Wilber posited were the same as 
the primordial purity / essence aspect of the Base, 
identifying it with “the unborn or the changeless 
ground”—that is, with the Base—would amount to 
identifying an aspect or part of a whole [emptiness 
thus understood] with the whole itself [the Base of 
Dzogchen]—which would be a major logical error.
27. As stated in a previous endnote, Wilber (2001b, 
note 1, pp. 717-741) gave as the source for his view 
on the progressive attainment of the four kāyas, 
none else than infamous Geshe Kelsang Gyamtso 
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(second name usually written without the “m;” cited 
repeatedly by Wilber in the same note, pp. 726-
729), who leads the most recent Tibetan Buddhist 
School, universally viewed by Tibetans (except for 
members of the school in question) as a terrorist 
organization that committed a bloody triple murder 
against associates of the Dalai Lama and that has 
repeatedly tried to murder the illustrious Tibetan 
Master-leader. Regarding these accusations, cf. the 
original Newsweek article (Clifton & Miller, 1997) 
and the exhaustive investigation by Raimondo 
Bultrini (2008), among other sources.
Furthermore, to his quotations of his dubious 
source Wilber added phrases in brackets such as 
“[which are both subtle-level illuminations]” and 
“[causal cessation],” which are very likely to distort 
the author’s intended meaning.
At any rate, the edition I have of Sex, Ecology, 
Spirituality is the 1st (Wilber, 1995) rather than the 
2nd, which is the one that Abramson (2010) used 
(namely Wilber, 2001b) and the one featuring the 
notes he referred to. Since due to foreign currency 
limitations it is so difficult to buy foreign books in 
Venezuela, and since I have so much to read for the 
research at the root of the several books I am writ-
ing, and reading Wilber is for me a rather unpleasant 
task, I never bought that 2nd ed.
28.  Personally, I do not read the works in questions be-
cause time limitations make me be highly selective 
with what I read (and, moreover, I would certainly 
not use my extremely limited access to non-Venezu-
elan currencies to buy his books). As to my advice 
to others, it comes from Chögyal Namkhai Norbu 
and other important Masters, who warn students 
against all possible contacts with anything having 
to do with the Gyalpo demon that the character in 
question and his associates worship, on the grounds 
that such contacts have the potential of making the 
individual susceptible to that demon and other be-
ings of its class. If the reader finds this strange, he 
or she may refer to my non-magical explanations of 
the inner meaning of the term “demon” in Chapter 
I of the upcoming book synthesizing the contents 
of the Beyond Mind papers (Capriles, in press) and 
my non-magical explanation of the inner meaning of 
guardians and elementals elsewhere (Capriles, 2000, 
2003). (In my retreats in the higher Himalayas a se-
ries of circumstances made me enter in conflict with 
worshippers of that Gyalpo demon, and strange 
events took place which included the destruction of 
buildings and human lives; since the account of this 
conflict would make a most interesting reading, I 
might write it down at some point.) As to the alleged 
dangerousness of the character in question, I have 
repeatedly directed readers to the original News-
week article (Clifton & Miller, 1997) and to the ex-
haustive investigation reported in Bultrini (2008).
29. In fact, in Wilber (2007), Appendix II, “Integral 
Post-Metaphysics” (p. 234), one reads:
1.    It is not justified to maintain that levels of 
reality exist as consciousness-independent 
structures just waiting to be discovered; 
rather, if there exist levels of reality, they 
exist as structures of human consciousness 
(that are co-constructed by subjects),
2.   The verification methods for the existence 
of these structures of consciousness must 
involve demands for objective evidence 
(modernity’s contribution) and intersubjec-
tive grounding (postmodernity’s contribu-
tion), and
3.  If structures of consciousness exist, they 
are not eternal and timeless structures 
but ‘forms that have developed in time, 
evolution, and history’. (p. 234, emphasis in 
original)
30. Note in Abramson (2010): 
But not historical eras. Although Wilber agrees 
that people of previous eras can advance to 
spiritual states irrespective of their stage of 
development, he continues to posit (as in 
Up from Eden, 1981) that some of the most 
“advanced” spiritual states were not attained 
in previous eras—i.e., the most advanced 
state increased from psychic in the “magic” 
era, through subtle and causal in succeeding 
eras, and only reached non-dual in the current 
era. This is clearly completely at variance with 
Capriles degenerative view of evolution. Also 
Capriles would maintain true Awakening/non-
dual states were potentially available, in any era, 
to anyone, at any stage of development, following 
an authentic (e.g. Dzogchen) spiritual path.
31. Wilber did so in the context of “proving” that, how-
ever much meditation accelerates stage develop-
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ment, cultural factors can potentially be a dominant 
breaking force.
32. As noted repeatedly, the character in question is 
accused of killing three associated of the Dalai Lama 
and of being behind at least three murder attempts 
against the great Tibetan spiritual and political 
leader. Once more I refer the reader interested in 
understanding the reasons for this, to Clifton with 
Miller (1997) and the exhaustive investigation 
reported in Bultrini (2008).
33.  The actual title is “Beyond Mind,” for the term 
“mind” is used to refer to a funcioning or a condi-
tion (as in “beyond fear”) rather than to a substance 
(as in “beyond the ocean”).
34.  Cf. endnote 23.
35.   True enough, he mentioned that for me the acces-
sibility of Communion will result from a reductio 
ad absurdum, and inserted a note that may give a 
clue to readers, but readers who are not very familiar 
with my views, and/or who do not read the notes, 
will miss this point.
36. Someone so informed as Wilber must necessarily be 
aware of the ecological situation of this planet and 
its consequences, and hence if he writes as though 
everything could continue to be the same for very 
long time without this resulting in our species’ 
self-destruction, he must necessarily be doing so on 
purpose. If he were not, then he would seem to be 
wearing blinders without noticing them.
37. “Since God is totally Good, He cannot deceive us, 
and hence he could not have instilled in us the be-
lief in an external, physical reality if the latter were 
nonexistent.”
38. Allegedly, at least one letter by Kant was found re-
cently in which he confessed not to believe any of 
the postulates of his own system, and to have pro-
duced the latter by order of a high political authori-
ty. However, most of those who hold Kant’s system 
dear, assert the letter to be apocryphal.
39. In the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, which 
represents his first period, Wittgenstein (1961) asserted 
language to be incapable of expressing reality, yet he 
still pretended to use language in order to distinguish 
atomic propositions that do not represent atomic 
events from those that do represent them and thus 
clarify the misconceptions produced by language, 
reaching a point at which language could finally be 
discarded (thus not being so far from the alternative 
trend in the philosophy of language). In his second 
period, principally represented by the Philosophical 
Investigations, Wittgenstein (1972) noted that humans 
suffer from a bewitchment of our intelligence by 
means of language that gave rise to false problems—
or that placed us in false labyrinths—that then 
philosophers would try in vain to solve, and declared 
all that he had written in his first period to be a 
product of the bewitchment in question, insisting 
that we had to rid ourselves from this bewitchment 
(and thus setting himself in a position that could 
hardly be more distant from that of the alternative 
trend in the philosophy of language) and in this way 
rid ourselves of the false problems seen from the 
labyrinths produced by language.
It must be noted that, although the Vienna Cir-
cle claimed to follow Wittgenstein, the latter assert-
ed logical positivism to be a gross misreading of his 
writings, and went so far as to read poetry during 
the Circle’s meetings. 
40. A perfect adæquatio or matching is impossible be-
cause, as shown in Vol. I of The Beyond Mind Pa-
pers: Transpersonal and Metatranspersonal Theory 
(Capriles, in press), conceptual maps are digital, 
whereas the territory they interpret is analog (the dis-
crepancy between these two being aptly illustrated 
by the relationships between a digital photograph, 
which is discontinuous, and what it represents, 
which is continuous and to which therefore it cannot 
correspond: if the number of dpis is extremely high, 
one may get the illusion that it looks roughly alike, 
but as soon as one zooms in all one sees is a combi-
nation of squares of different colors having no resem-
blance whatsoever with reality); because the territory 
is holistic, whereas the maps of language are lineal 
and fragmentary; and because from different view-
points different maps are equally valid and, for the 
same reason, equally incapable of perfect correspon-
dence with what they represent. However, the prob-
lem arises when the fragmentary outlook the Buddha 
(Udāna, Tathāgatagarbhasūtra) represented with the 
fable of the men with the elephant takes its percep-
tions to fit the undivided, holistic territory they in-
terpret—and in general when one confuses the map 
with the territory or takes it to perfectly correspond 
to it, as happens when the basic human delusion that 
the Buddha called avidyā and Heraclitus called lethe 
is active. Cf. also Capriles (2004) and other works.
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41.  Sorel’s apology of violence is to be rejected with all 
of one’s might.
42. Gramsci (1998) wrote: “In reality science is also a 
superstructure, an ideology.”
43. As shown in Appendix I to Capriles (in press), sci-
ence and technology were being developed long be-
fore the modern age in Greece, and were particular-
ly dear to the Pythagorians, to whose ideology they 
were associated at the time. However, Christianiza-
tion suspended the project until the Modern Age, 
when it was revived in its present form, in the way 
expressed in the section of the regular text to which 
this note was appended.
45.  I discussed this thesis by Marcuse (which he put 
forward in ch. 6 of Marcuse [1964], “From Nega-
tive to Positive Thinking: Technological Rationality 
and the Logic of Domination”) elsewhere (Capriles, 
2007a Vol. III).
46.  Deleuze is criticized in two different sections of 
Sokal & Bricmont (1999); however, the theory ac-
cording to which philosophy and the sciences are 
“more than ideologies” is not among the objects of 
this criticism.
47.   In his Commentary to Āryadeva’s Catuhśa-
takaśāstrakārikā, the Catuhśatakatīkā, Buddhist 
Mādhyamika-Prāsangika Master and philosopher 
Candrakīrti told the fable of a king that consulted 
a famous astrologer, who predicted that a rainfall 
of “maddening water” would pollute the reservoirs 
in his kingdom, as a consequence of which all who 
drank from them would be driven insane. Conse-
quently the king commanded that a giant, covered 
reservoir be built for him to drink from, and warned 
his ministers and subjects, telling them to prepare a 
protected supply of water and avoid drinking the de-
ranging water. However, the subjects, unable to build 
reservoirs as big as the king’s, or even as the minis-
ters’, exhausted their reserves quite rapidly, and soon 
had to drink contaminated water. Since the king 
and the ministers behaved quite differently from the 
subjects who drank the maddening water, the latter 
concluded that the former had become insane. Then, 
when the ministers used up their reserves, they also 
had to drink the deranging water—upon which the 
rest of the subjects “realized” the ministers had come 
to their senses, and all agreed the only one who was 
still insane was the king. Hence in order to keep his 
kingdom and avoid being impeached and put into 
an asylum, the king had no option but to drink the 
polluted water (Trungpa, 1976; Chöphel, 2005; Sūfī 
version in Shah, 1970).
48. It has been alleged that the project of modernity, 
rather than being aimed at begetting a technolog-
ical Eden, was intended to allow the ruling class to 
increase its exploitation of the rest of human society, 
and that the ideal of the technological Eden was no 
more than a façade or a pretext. However, it does 
not seem likely that the promoters of the project in 
question (or at least the majority of them) were in-
tentionally deceiving others in this way—and since 
the wealthiest and most powerful people and their 
descendents would be destroyed together with the 
rest of society, the project’s effects would indicate 
delusion to have been at its root even if the interpre-
tation discussed in this note were correct.
49.  It is well known that the initial philosophical elab-
oration of the project of modernity was carried our 
in its empiricist version by Francis Bacon, and in 
its rationalist version by René Descartes. Later on, 
positivism gave a different expression to it, and the 
same did the grand systems of modernity, among 
which the most renowned are Hegel’s and Marx’s. 
In general, almost all philosophers of the modern 
era (with exceptions such as Georges Sorel and a few 
others) elaborated different versions of the myth in 
question.
50. A lengthier discussion of this subject is featured in 
Capriles (2007a, Vol. III); my initial discussion of 
the subject appeared in Capriles (1994) and there 
is an ample discussion of it in the Introduction to 
Capriles (2012).
51. That which Kant called “transcendental illusion(s)” 
consisted in going beyond the empirical use of the 
categories of the Understanding and applying these 
categories to “transcendent objects”—which most 
key twentieth century phenomenologists did not 
posit. However, according to Kant, the transcenden-
tal illusion stood on subjective principles that seemed 
to be objective; provided that one understands the 
term subjective as referring to whatever manifests in 
the individual’s mind—that is, thoughts, represen-
tations, mental phenomena—as different from all 
that is not merely thought or representation, this is 
the core error of phenomenology.
52.  In Capriles, 2007a Vol. I, I undertook an exhaustive 
discussion of the defects of phenomenological and 
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existential twentieth century thought, on the basis 
of a careful hermeneutical analysis of the essential 
works of the thinkers concerned.
53.  In spite of having received important influences from 
Buddhism and Daoism, and of having claimed that 
Zen Buddhism broadcaster D. T. Suzuki was saying 
exactly what he tried to say throughout his works 
(May, 1996; Saviani, 2004), in itself Heidegger’s con-
cept of being (das Sein) was not only contradictory, 
but contrary to Buddhist theory as well. In fact, on 
the one hand he identified it with the arché  which 
is the underlying principle and true condition of 
the universe and which may be the same as the true 
nature of phenomena (Skt. dharmatā; Tib. chönyi 
[chos nyid]) or perhaps the all-encompassing space 
in which phenomena manifest (Skt. dharmadhātu; 
Tib. chöjing [chos dbyings]) of Mahāyāna Buddhism, 
which does not exclude anything and has no limits 
(so that, as Nāgārjuna made it clear, it cannot en-
ter into the concept of being, that of nonbeing, that 
of both-being-and-nonbeing or that of neither-be-
ing-nor-nonbeing)—and which is an absolute that as 
such is impossible to eradicate. Yet on the other hand 
he asserted it to be a phenomenon that is elicited 
whenever we think of, listen or pronounce the word 
being—thus contradicting its identification with the 
arché, for whatever the mind conceives has limits 
(for it is defined by proximate gender [genus prox-
imum] and specific difference [differentiam specifi-
cam]), and therefore could not be the limitless arché, 
dharmatā or dharmadhātu. Furthermore, as shown 
elsewhere (Capriles 2007a vol. I, 2007c, and other of 
my works), that which manifests when one thinks 
of, listens to, or pronounces the word “being” is the 
most basic delusive appearance of samsāra. (In the 
same work, on the basis of several of Heidegger’s key 
works, I exposed what from the standpoint of Bud-
dhism and Dzogchen are the German philosopher’s 
core philosophical errors, and discuss the numerous 
books giving proof of the influence he received from 
Buddhism and to some extent from Daoism, as well 
as of the fact that he believed his philosophy to be 
congruent with the systems in question.)
54. In Sartre (1980) the French philosopher does not 
reduce being to the phenomenon of being (in his 
view [Sartre, 1980] the phenomenon of being is not 
the being of the phenomenon), but implies it to be 
a kind of absolute that precedes human experience 
and is independent from the latter (in fact, since he 
asserts the being of the human individual that he 
calls être-pour-soi to arise in [preexisting] being, 
in his view being cannot depend on human experi-
ence). Although he avoided the error of making of 
the absolute an “absolute of knowledge,” effectively 
deconstructed the Cartesian-Husserlian cogito, and 
offered concepts and descriptions I have used to 
great profit in various works (Capriles, 1994, 2007a 
vol. I, 2012), he breached the phenomenological ep-
oché in various ways. Cf. Capriles (2007a Vol. I).
55. For a short discussion of the way in which Sartre 
managed this, cf. Capriles (2010); for an in-depth 
treatment, cf. Capriles (2007a Vol. I) and perhaps 
also Capriles (2004).
56. However, Sartre’s holon, soi or Self is definitively 
not Aristotle’s immovable motor, which was for the 
Greek philosopher the final cause (telos) of human 
existence. In Sartre (1980), pp. 137-8, one reads:
The relation between value and the for-Self is 
very particular: [value] is the being that [the for-
Self] is to be insofar as it is the foundation of its 
own nothingness of being [i.e. nonbeing]. And 
if [the for-Self] is to be this being, it is not so 
under an external constraint, or because value, 
like Aristotle’s first motor, would exert upon it 
a de facto attraction, or by virtue of a character 
received from its being; rather, it is that it makes 
itself be in its being as having to be this being.
57.  Sartre defined the holon in a way that makes it 
seem the same as Awakening, even though his defi-
nition of the term is internally contradictory—this 
being the reason why I had to redefine it (Capriles, 
2007a Vol. I, 2012). In fact, Sartre used the term 
holon in a sense very different from Koestler’s 
(1967; Koestler & Smythies, 1970), to designate 
the Totality characterized by fullness, plenitude, 
and coincidence with itself that being-for-Self tries 
to attain through all of its endeavors, which in-
volves what the French philosopher inaccurately 
called the “translucency of consciousness proper 
to being-for-Self” simultaneously with the “coinci-
dence with itself ” characteristic of being-in-itself, 
and which is beyond the duality between these two 
modes of being. Sartre likened this Totality unto 
the God of Catholic theologians, and the charac-
teristics he attributed to it coincide with those of 
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Awakening—except for some basic problems in his 
definition that were problematized and resolved in 
Capriles, 2007a Vol. I, and for the fact that Sartre 
deemed it to be impossible to attain.
In fact, Sartre deemed the holon to be unat-
tainable, and throughout his books he dealt solely 
with the experiences and ontological structures of 
samsāra; etc. However, he was right in noting that 
all that being-for-Self does for attaining the Self / 
holon maintains it as being-for-Self and thus as be-
ing-at-a-distance-from-the-Self / holon—this being 
the reason why he asserted being-for-Self to be un-
happy consciousness unable to overcome its inherent 
condition of unhappiness. Thus being-for-Self has 
no choice but to elude this unhappiness by means 
of bad faith (self-deceit)—authenticity (in the sense 
of not eluding anguish and shame by means of bad 
faith) being therefore, in Sartre’s view, impossible to 
achieve in a continuous way.
58. This term was coined by Derrida for expressing a 
particular type of difference (différance), which he 
said is rather the condition of possibility of differ-
ence; he made this term differ in spelling but not 
in pronunciation from the French term différence 
(“difference”) in order to mark a sharp difference 
of meaning. As just noted, différance is not mere-
ly difference; it is supposed to be that which makes 
differences possible and which constitutes all signs 
as signs (i.e., as something that refers to something 
supposedly different from itself). In order to further 
explain what is différance I would have to use oth-
er Derridean terms and explanations which then 
would need to be explained, so I direct readers who 
are not familiar with Derrida’s thought to Capriles 
(2007a Vol. III). 
59.  In fact, no one could deny that throughout his works 
Derrida has outlined an ontology. For a sample of 
how this is so, suffice to mention his statement that, 
“the thing itself is a sign.” He wrote (Derrida, 1967, 
in the Engligh version [1976 / 1998], Ch. Linguistics 
and Grammatology, p. 49):
Peirce goes very far in the direction that I have 
called the de-construction of the transcendental 
signified, which, at one time or another, would 
place a reassuring end to the reference from sign 
to sign. I have identified logocentrism and the 
metaphysics of presence as the exigent, power-
ful, systematic, and irrepressible desire for such 
a signified. Now Peirce considers the indefinite-
ness of reference as the criterion that allows us 
to recognise that we are indeed dealing with a 
system of signs. What broaches the movement 
of signification is what makes its interruption 
impossible. The thing itself is a sign.
De-ontologizing entities itself implies and bears 
an ontological position according to which there are 
no ultimate, truly existing entities as such—which 
would make of Derrida’s philosophy a meta-ontolo-
gy as I have defined the term (Capriles, 2007a Vol. 
I, etc.) if this de-ontologization were brought to its 
last consequences, and if it involved methods for dis-
solving the experience of entities as ultimate, truly 
existing as such.
60.  These questions occur  in several places in the Nikāyas: 
they are discussed in detail in Khuddaka Nikāya, III: 
Udāna; and they appear twice in Majjimanikāya, 
I [sutta 72]; once in Samyuttakāya, III and once 
in Samyuttakāya, IV; once in Dīghanikāya 9 
[Potthapāda Sutta] and once in Dīghanikāya 29 
[Pāsādika Sutta]. For his part, Nāgārjuna discussed 
them in Mūlamādhyamakakārikāh, XXVII, and—
if the Chinese were right that he authored the 
Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra—also in the latter.
61.  The event(s) of nirvān. a could be equally regarded as 
countless or as a single one, for although in nirvān. a 
no differences apply, language has to distinguish 
among different moments. Thus metaphenomenon 
is as valid and as wrong as metaphenomena—terms 
in which the prefix meta indicates that they are not 
mere appearance (phainómenon), as they unveil the 
true condition of reality.
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